

Gender and the Arab Spring: Lessons from Political Transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya

NDI

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Lindsay Benstead, Portland State University

Ellen Lust, Yale University

Jakob Wichmann, JMW Consulting

Gender and the Arab Spring

Data

- Survey of 1202 Tunisians, October-November 2012 (Benstead and Lust)
 - Funded by the National Science Foundation, Yale University, Portland State University, Princeton University, Centre d'études maghrébines à Tunis (CEMAT), Project on Middle East Political Science
- Survey of 4080 Egyptians, September-October 2012 (Lust and Wichmann/JMW Consulting)
 - Funded and implemented by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute

Gender and Political Participation


Key observations

- Women participate less and make vote choice later than men
- Gender gap less pronounced in Tunisia than Egypt


Women and Participation

Voting in Last Parliamentary Election

Egypt:
Men more likely to vote than women: 77% men voted in 2011 compared to 58% of women (19% gap)




Tunisia:
Men more likely to vote than women: 75% of men voted in 2011 compared to 65% of women (10% gap)




Women and Participation

Participation in Demonstrations

Egypt: Men participated more than women in the 2011 protests than women by a 14% margin ($p < 0.000$)



Tunisia: Men participated more than women in the 2010 protests by a 7% margin and after 2010 by a 16% margin



Gender and Values


Key observation

- Women and men have similar values and policy preferences (e.g. preferences for a secular or religious state)


Women and Values

Personal Preference between Capitalism and Socialism

Egypt: There is no difference between the men and women when it comes to economic values ($p < 0.405$)




Tunisia: There is no difference between the men and women when it comes to economic values ($p < .610$)




Women and Values

Personal Preference between Religiosity and Secularism

Egypt: Women prefer a less secular state ($p < 0.000$)



Tunisia: There is no difference between the men and women when it comes to religious values ($p < .645$)



Gender and the Arab Spring

Preliminary Conclusions

- Women have lower political participation and make decision to vote later than men
- Women and men have similar values and policy preferences (e.g. preference for a secular or religious state), but important puzzles emerge
- Gender quotas in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt do not automatically elect women who will promote a secular, liberal vision of gender equality
 - Need context-sensitive information to understand how promotion of equality through quotas affect the development of democracy/liberal democracy.

Research Questions

Key question


- Whether and why stereotypes and biases affect respondents' likelihood to support female and overtly religious candidates.

Data and Methods

Methodology

- Survey experiment embedded within the Tunisian Post-Election Survey
- “Please tell me how likely you would be to vote for each of the following candidates or party lists in the future. Would you definitely not vote for (=1), probably not vote for (=2), probably vote for (=3), and definitely vote for (=4) the following?”
- Photos of secular male, secular female, religious male, and religious female

Support for secular or religious male or female candidates



The secular and religious female candidates do not differ significantly in their popularity ($p < .16$). All other differences statistically significant.

Source: Egyptian and Tunisian Transitional Election Studies

Modernization Theory

Prediction

- Higher education, income, and urban residence and lower religiosity predict smaller bias against female candidates


Role Congruity Theory (Eagly and Krau, 2002)

Prediction

- Social structural theory and extension of social role theory (Eagly, 1987)
- Descriptive stereotypes help explain the gender gap in women's electability
 - Gender Roles:
 - Female: communal, nurturing, emotional
 - Male: objective, agentic
 - Leader Roles
- More congruity between the female gender role and leadership roles predicts smaller bias against female candidates.

Support for religious or secular candidates


H2a: Higher levels of education among men and women will be related to a smaller gap in preferences for male and female candidates.



Education is unrelated to support for female candidates ($p < .59$). There is negative relationship between education and support for male candidates ($p < .00$).


Support for male or female candidates

H2d: To the extent that religion is “traditional,” those who practice religion should be more likely to a gap in preferences for male and female candidates than those who do not.



Support for female candidates is positively related to frequency of doing religious activities ($p < 0.03$).

Support for secular or religious male or female candidates



Source: Egyptian and Tunisian Transitional Election Studies

Conclusions

Conclusions

- Data fit the expectations of role congruity theory
- Gender and religious identity intersect to affect candidate success
- Islamist voters may not punish females at the polls, even if they are not supportive of gender equality
 - Dependability
 - Respectability

Gender and the Arab Spring

Implications

- Gender quotas in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt do not automatically elect women who will promote a secular, liberal vision of gender equality
- To the extent that religious women are electable, it is due to their “respectability” and “reliability”
- Gender mainstreaming programs need to take into consideration multiple categories of identity (e.g. gender, age, specific needs of women in different parties) and address participation and efficacy gap of female citizens