



Konrad  
Adenauer  
Stiftung

# THE ESCALATION OF GENDER- BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE MENA REGION

EDITED BY  
FATIMA SADIQI  
HELMUT REIFELD



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## **INTRODUCTION**

*Fatima SADIQI*

Admittedly, the post-Arab Spring turmoil is affecting men, women, and children, but specific types of pernicious violence systematically target women and girls. The post-Arab Spring initial backlash on women's rights is not only gathering momentum every day, but it is developing into unprecedented new types of violence against women with the dangerously mounting tide of Jihadists. The new forms of violence range from the imposition of the niqab (total veiling), the ban of women from public unless they are accompanied by a male member of the family, a return of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) for women between the ages of 11 and 46, stoning to death of women in cases of adultery, assassination of female activists, and enslavement (buying/selling of women and girls). These new forms of violence are indirectly "sanctioning" the already familiar types such as moralization incriminating women for any social crisis, domestic battering, increased sexual harassment, forced marriage, and (gang) rape that accompanied the post-uprising phases in the region. The ambiguous barriers between moderate and extremist Islamists is intensifying the daily misery of women in most parts of the region and threatening the hard-won rights, and systematic brainwashing is involving more and more women in the recruitment of female Jihadists. In parallel, extreme violence against women is heavily used in the Jihadists propaganda narratives and glorified by mainstream media. The dire absence of statistics, let alone serious academic research, on this issue is adding fuel to an already hot problem whose short- and long- term social, economic, and political repercussions are far-reaching and call for a combination of reliable research and urgent policies.

This volume gathers 15 selected papers that were presented in the seventh edition of the Mediterranean Forum which was held in Fez, Morocco on May 29, 30 and 31 in partnership between Isis Center for Women and Development and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung – Rabat.

The volume contains papers from Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, The USA and Germany. The central aim of the book is to document and unveil the new types of violence that women are subject to across the Middle East and North Africa region, link



them to the familiar types, understand their social, economic and political ramifications, dig out their surface and deeper underpinnings especially in relation to Jihadism, propose strategies to stop them, and seek short- and long- term policies that would implement these strategies. The overarching aim of the book is to highlight the relevance of the topics tackled by authors who belong to the worlds of academia, politics and activism for the sensitive, tantalizing, and boarder issues such women's economic and political empowerment, the reform of education, the reform of the religious field, masculinity, the enhancement of an inclusive democracy in the region, the separation of religion from politics, the role of the media, and the heterogeneous nature of political Islam. As Islam is at the same time an integral part of men's and women's everyday life and a ruling tool at all levels, the papers in this book seek to integrate it as part of the solution not the problem.

## **THE IMPACT OF EXTREMISM ON JORDANIAN WOMEN**

*Dania AL-HJOJ*

### **Introduction**

Coupled with a political leadership that has always supported women's rights and countered extremism, the efforts of civil society organizations and other national entities, including the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW), have resulted in numerous accomplishments in this regard. Some of these accomplishments are highlighted below.

### **In legislation**

- The introduction of constitutional amendments in 2011 that enhanced political and civil liberties.
- The introduction of a series of new laws and regulations, as well as amendments to existing laws, with the aim of advancing human and women's rights. Laws that have been amended include: Domestic Violence Law (2008), the temporary Personal Status Law (2010), and the Political Parties Law (2012) which stipulates that women must constitute at least 10 percent of the total founders of the party.
- The establishment of a constitutional court (law 15; 2012).
- Amendments were also made to the following laws: the Civil Service By-law (2013), the Elections' Law (2012) which allocated 15 seats to women; the Municipalities Law which raised the participation of women in local councils from 20 percent to 25 percent, the Social Security Law (2014), and the Juveniles Law (2014).
- The Ministry of Interior has also recently issued special regulations granting children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians benefits that facilitate their access to education, health as well as job and investment opportunities.
- In 2009, Jordan ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially women and children.
- The enactment of an Anti-Human Trafficking Law (No 9, 2009).
- On October 24, 2013, Jordan accepted the recommendations of the Human rights Council to repeal Article 308 of the Penal code and any other articles discriminating against women.

## **In Political Participation**

- Women’s participation in the parliament grew from 10.8 percent in 2009 to 12 percent in 2013. In 2013, a new committee for women and children’s affairs was created and added to the existing 20 permanent committees in the parliament.
- Women form 12 percent of the Upper house of Senates, and a new committee for women was also introduced to become one of its permanent committees.
- Women’s participation in local councils grew from 39.5 percent in 2013 as a result of the 2011 Municipalities Law.
- Women’s participation in political parties also reached 32 percent.
- Women occupy 18 percent of ministerial posts (ministries of transport, culture, social development, industry and trade, information and communications technology).
- Women make up 40 percent of the Council of Independent Election Committee.
- There were 175 female judges in 2014 (18 percent of the total number).
- Women form 18.4 percent of representatives in the diplomatic corps.

Thanks to the political will and Jordan’s significant investment in education, the country has succeeded in closing the gender gap in education and enhancing women’s engagement in all spheres.

JNCW seeks to institutionalize these efforts through the constitution and legislations. In order to realize justice and equal opportunities for all, some laws still need amendments, while other new laws need to be introduced.

## **What is Extremism?**

Conceptually, extremism is a set of beliefs and ideas that differ from the political, social and religious consensus. Having different forms, extremism can be political, racial, social, or religious. Not only does extremism vary from one society to another, but the very definition of extremism also varies within the same society according to personal attitudes.

What is important for us is that this mindset should not be associated with Islam, as extremists have interpreted it according to their own agendas, turning a blind eye to what the majority considers "the sound interpretation" of religion. Extremist interpretations are oblivious to the fact that Islam and all other religions have prohibited extremism in speech and beliefs.

Extremism is caused by a host of factors which may be summarized as follows: lack of political solutions, lack of justice and equal opportunities, absence of dialogue, failure in economic and financial development, failure to provide basics of a decent life, innate acceptance of extremism, prevalence of social traditions over the law, lack of modern educational systems that promote creative progressive thinking rather than spoon-feeding systems; dismissal of the role of critical thinking in analyzing events and responding to them in a scientific comprehensive manner.

While military and security solutions can help with the material side of extremism, they certainly fall short of addressing the ideological roots, instilled in the minds of extremists and those who sympathize with them. Unless they are accompanied by a sound intellectual discourse, led by religious, scientific and cultural leaders, these efforts will remain insufficient.

This is the approach that rehabilitation and correction centers in Jordan want to supply. However, if we want this intervention to have an added value and a real impact, it is imperative to carry out a series of reforms on the political, economic and social levels. Special emphasis should be placed on youth as they are targeted by extremists.

It is important to underline the fact that women have borne the brunt of the complicated situation created by the rise of extremist movements and political turmoil at large. As a result, women's accomplishments have been undermined, which urges us to collaborate, as men and women, to preserve what Jordanian women struggled for years to achieve.

As we have seen in countries where extremist movements are powerful, new ideas that were eliminated dozens of years ago were re-introduced, such as: holding women captives; creating a women's market; displacement; poverty; unemployment; preventing women from work.

Placed in the eye of storm, Jordan remains one of the most prone to spillovers from Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya and other countries in an interlinked region. In addition, extremism is transnational, especially with a transnational media production, the internet and social media channels, which fact further threatens progressive and civil discourses.

Since a series of wars broke out in 2011, Jordanian women suffered from backward beliefs that affected their daily lives. The majority of extremist movements perceive women as "sex objects" and completely dismiss their role in spite of their achievements.

### **Impact of Extremism on Jordanian Women**

Due to a transnational media production, we have started to hear some misogynist statements concerning the role of women in society. This, in turn, affects a woman's self-image and the mindsets of youth. Some examples include:

- Women should either be prevented from work at all or forced to work in certain sectors only.
- Women should have freedom of dress and movement
- Women's free will in marriage should be confiscated
- Early marriage should be encouraged despite having an article in the Personal Status Law that prohibits marriage before the age of 18 with minimal exceptions, based on the discretion of the supreme judge.

### **The Role of the Media in the Fight Against Extremism**

Women were the main victims of extremism's influence in the Mena region as a whole as it promotes negative stereotypes of women and undermines their achievements. The media plays a pivotal role against this backdrop, as it can help counter these ideas and their implications on different social, economic and political levels. Media is the most effective tool in the upcoming phase in the fight against the propaganda of extremists and the promotion of a different concept of women's role. Reference here is to all media outlets, including mainstream and social media channels. In terms of the actual content, it is important to avoid sending direct messages that preach these concepts, and hence strip them from appeal and impact.

The target audience can be divided into groups. While women must be targeted, special emphasis should be placed on adolescents, who are at a critical point of belief system formation. A few years later, these adolescents will be independent decision-makers, qualified to have their own families and rear their children. Media production and the discourse of extremism continue to target this segment irrespective of the social, economic, cultural and knowledge backgrounds. Therefore, it is imperative to address youth through well-designed plans in communications and culture.

While media is an important and effective tool, its impact depends on its resources and professional approach. Failing to use media professionally leads to dual loss; it prevents the necessary messages from reaching out to people and achieving the expected impact on one hand, and ends up strengthening the other camp on the other hand, which seems stronger and more professional. If media fails to play its role, extremist discourse will continue to appeal to society, especially youth.

In Jordan, there is a number of radio stations that present a moderate Islamic discourse, such as radio Amen which presents the following programs: Hatha Huwa Al Islam program and Rifqan bil Qawareer. We also have Radio Hayat which presents Bait Hawwa program, Radio Yaqeen which presents religious programs with a moderate discourse in addition to the mainstream Jordan Radio and TV. However, other extremist media outlets also exist and, interestingly, some soap operas promote issues like early marriage and the inability of women to take decisions.

This being said, the negative effect on youth and women's self-image is not surprising. Therefore, progressive enlightened women, who are proponents of women's rights and community development, should be partners in media production. Needless to say, engaging women who do not believe in these rights can negatively affect women's image and roles in the society.

### **The Role of Political Leadership in the Fight against Extremism**

Facing direct and indirect threats, Jordan is concerned with all these issues and needs to propose a clear vision, to be discussed with the West and concerned states in the region. Jordan is targeted by extremist movements, and it is prone to several economic, political and security risks should other states in the region fall.

Launched by King Abdullah II in 2004, Amman's Message aims at raising awareness to the real essence of Islam. According to the message, Islam has presented the most honorable forms of justice, moderation, tolerance, acceptance of others and renunciation of extremism and violence. The message also urged youth to defend the religion of tolerance in the face of discord. In addition, it celebrated commonalities between followers of different religions, which can be a basis for dialogue and a fruitful understanding that respects the freedom of conscience and the unity of the human race.

The message also sought to eliminate discrimination, based on gender, race, color and class and stress equality in duties and responsibilities. Furthermore, it called on the international community to implement international law and respect conventions and UN resolutions. The role of scholars in promoting the real essence of Islam was also emphasized, as it helps protect youth from following these paths of ignorance.

During the 65<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, King Abdullah II also introduced the initiative of the International Week of Religious Coexistence. According to his suggestion, a week will be chosen when sites of worship will come together to express their rituals and religious beliefs that encourage tolerance, respect for others, security and peace. This was actually implemented in Jordan, a country that has witnessed tolerance and peaceful coexistence for decades. The Jordanian government also developed a comprehensive strategy, with the aim of strengthening the internal front and fighting against extremist movements.

As part of the Democratic Empowerment Program, several youth initiatives are supported to achieve goals that include: activating dialogue, promoting respect of freedom of speech and diversity, and acceptance of the other. Some of these initiatives sought to establish special radio stations, a debate program throughout the country and the councils of human rights in schools. If implemented properly, these initiatives can counter the extremist discourse, support youth and enhance their participation in political life.

### **The Role of Iftaa Department in the Fight against Extremism**

The Iftaa (religious edicts) Department developed plans to combat religious extremism, seen as a widely-spread phenomenon among

certain youth segments. In order to combat the threats posed by extremist discourses, the Department collaborated with the Ministry of Education to conduct seminars and lectures to raise awareness among the Jordanian public. In addition, youth clubs, cultural centers and charity societies have all been targeted. It also issued a Fatwa prohibiting joining any movement with an extremist ideology.

### **The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Fight against Extremism**

Civil society organizations play a pivotal role in the fight against extremism. Women, the most vulnerable victims of this phenomenon, are the main targets.

To this end, civil society organizations conducted several workshops and media interviews to raise awareness among women. In addition, they reached out to women throughout the country and sought to strengthen patriotism as a main pillar of security and stability in the society. Achieving social justice and safeguarding human rights are the most effective ways to fight against extremism.

Lastly, it is important to stress joining forces with all parties and civil society organizations in this battle against extremism. A joint media outlet for all Arab states is needed to counter the extremist discourse through soap operas, films, and TV programs. Media plays an important role in shaping public opinion, namely among youth, so states need to develop policies to support media and cultural production. In addition, civil society organizations need to ensure that sufficient financial resources are directed towards media and cultural production that counter misogynist extremist ideology. Further, the role of educational institutions in bringing up a generation of leaders, capable of fighting against all forms of terrorism and extremism is crucial.





## **VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ARAB - PALESTINIAN SOCIETY IN ISRAEL**

*Taghreed KAIDAN*

### **Introduction**

Violence against women is a violation of their human rights that entails enormous personal, social, and economic costs (WHO, 2012) and must be considered an urgent social issue. In this short essay I wish to discuss the situation in Arab-Palestinian society in the State of Israel. After providing current data, I will review the special context of Arab-Palestinian women in Israel, the difficulties in combating violence against women associated with this context, and the measures taken by Arab civil society organizations and individuals to counter these difficulties.

### **Violence against Arab Women : The Numbers**

Accurate numbers regarding violence against women are notoriously difficult to come by, mainly because most women do not submit complaints (Gal, 2003). In Israel there is the added difficulty that most studies of violence do not include Arab women or do not differentiate between Arab and Jewish women, nor is there any central database of such cases (Midot, 2010, p. 12). The first – and to date only – Israeli national survey on domestic violence was conducted in the years 2000-2001 (Eisikovits, Winstok, & Fishman, 2004) among a general sample of the entire population of Israel. The researchers used questionnaires and also interviewed both spouses while attempting to measure the frequency and intensity of various types of physical and psychological abuse as well as attitudes towards them. Six percent of women reported being subjected to physical violence in the past year, 7.6 percent were sexually abused, 6.1 percent were threatened with force, and 56 percent were exposed to emotional abuse (cursing, screaming, etc.). Forty percent of the battered women in the survey were Muslim - double their proportion in the general population. Importantly, only 24.8 percent of the women said that they involved the police in this matter, which suggests that the data available to police and other authorities is very incomplete. This comprehensive survey addressed only battered women and thus does not address all types of violence against women, such as against daughters and other female relatives.

A recent report, submitted by the Knesset Research and Information Center (KRIC, 2014) to the Committee on the Status of Women and Gender Equality (currently headed by MK Aida Touma-Sliman of the Joint Arab List), states that 3 Arab women were murdered in 2014 by their husbands and another 11 were murdered by other members of the family – these numbers have not changed significantly in the past few years. The welfare services reported that in the year 2014 (as of November that year), 645 women and 932 children stayed at the 14 shelters budgeted by the state; 40 percent of the women were Arab. The Ministry of Welfare operates 14 such shelters - 2 of them intended for Arab women and two for mixed population of Jews and Arabs - and 15 transition apartments for abused women, only one of which is intended for Arab women. Welfare representatives stated that the number of shelters is sufficient (KRIC, 2014); a statement severely disputed by both Jewish and Arab organizations (Kandalaft & Rohana, 1997). According to Gal (2003), between 1997 and 1999, two thirds of Arab women who applied to the shelter for battered women were rejected due to lack of room.

A previous report from the Knesset Research and Information Center (2013) showed a significant rise in the number of complaints received by police from Arab women victims of violence: from 1887 complaints in 2009 (11 percent of all complaints) to 2224 in 2012, constituting 16 percent of all such complaints. Despite this increase, complaints of Arab women are still far below the proportion of Arab women in the population (20 percent) and the frequency of acts of violence towards them. Interestingly, the number of Arab men convicted and jailed for violence against Arab women is almost 40 percent of all those jailed for such crimes (1838 men in all), in other words almost double their proportion in the general population and very similar to the number of battered Muslim women found in the general survey mentioned above (Eisikovits et al., 2004). The report from 2013 also states that the Ministry of Welfare operates 84 centers and units for treatment of domestic violence, 20 of which serve the Arab population. Though this is in line with the size of the Arab population in Israel, it seems less than adequate considering the evidence that violence against women in Arab society is far more prevalent than in Jewish society. The Knesset reports aggregate data from welfare services, hospitals, and police. In many cases, and especially in cases of sexual abuse, the complainant wishes to remain anonymous so the data regarding

violence against women is incomplete. The real magnitude of the problem can only be estimated. For example, one NGO estimates that half of all married Arab women in Israel are beaten at least once a year and 25% at least once every 6 months, though women rarely report the incidents (Interagency Taskforce on Israeli Arab issues, 2014).

### **Sources of the Problem**

Violence in the Palestinian family in Israel is considered a serious and pervasive problem by those concerned with the issue, such as the numerous Arab feminist organizations that have sprung up in the past two decades to deal with it (Biady-Shlon, 2014). According to Haj-Yahia (2005), one of the fundamental reasons for this situation is the patriarchal structure of Arab-Palestinian society in Israel, which generates sexism and inequality between men and women and thus encourages men to apply violence to women in an attempt to preserve the existing power structure. Furthermore, this same patriarchal power structure also makes it very difficult for women to seek aid for their situation. Haj-Yahia argues that men in Palestinian society - similar to other patriarchal societies - are over-privileged and benefit from more resources than women in both the private and public spheres. This superiority is seen as natural and as justifying violence to preserve it. This conception is supported by others that prevail in Palestinian society, such as the disapproval of one-parent families and divorce, and support for the traditional role of women as mothers and caregivers - and not as independent, achievement-oriented individuals. These social conceptions also can lead to a negative self-conceptions of Arab women.

Such conceptions and attitudes can explain the results of various surveys and studies conducted among Israeli Arabs. For instance, Haj-Yahia (2003) surveyed a random sample of Arab-Israeli husbands and found that about half justified beating one's wife, depending on the circumstances, about half expressed understanding of the husband, and about a third blamed the wife for the husband's violence toward her. This reflects the attitude in the general Israeli population. About half of the men and women agree that the violent man is not solely responsible for the violence, that the violence is a private affair and does not deserve drastic consequences (Eisikovits et al. 2004). A recent poll of Arab women conducted by the largest women's organization in Israel, Na'amat, found that 70 percent of

Arab women in Israel believe women who are pushed, slapped, or struck by their male partners are not victims of domestic violence and 73 percent believe women whose partners curse or humiliate them are not victims of violence. A quarter of the women surveyed said that violence toward women can be justified (Sinai, 2008). Another survey conducted by Women against Violence (2005) among 1200 Arab-Israeli respondents found that over a third of respondents justified hitting women who do not take care of the children or who leave the house without the husband's permission. A quarter of the respondents justified hitting a woman when arguing with her. Almost 60 percent refused to describe forced sex with one's wife as rape, saying that this is the prerogative of the husband. Almost 40 percent of men justified honor killings. Nearly 70 percent of men said that women's virginity before marriage is important and its absence justifies divorce. Thus it is clear that attitudes and values in Israeli-Palestinian society are an important reason for the continuing violence and discrimination against women.

Another unique source of the persistence of violence is the fact that Israeli society as a whole is a patriarchal society. This means that if victims of violence do have the courage to approach the authorities, they are met with an unfavorable attitude, which sometimes leads to their death. This is exactly what happened recently to Aisha Ala'asam, a 15-year-old girl from the town of Tal Al-Sabe', who was murdered by her brother on November 26, 2012. According to Hawari (2014), this was not an exceptional case (see also Gal, 2003, p.104-106):

The Israeli police had known that Aisha's life was at risk. They had been informed that she had been threatened by her family. She had filed several complaints regarding the danger she was exposed to, but nevertheless, the Israeli police returned her home after a stay with her uncle, who assured her that he would protect her. The police stood silent as Aisha fell victim first to social laws characterized by patriarchal authority, and second to the lack of enforcement of the Israeli law. (Hawari, 2014, p.1)

After the inception of the State of Israel, it was convenient for the state to govern the Arab population through its existing, traditional (patriarchal) power structures (Pepe, 1995). However in doing so, the state continues – to this day– to reinforce this structure at the

expense of the lives of Arab women, by ignoring complaints of Arab women, attributing crimes to customs traditions and culture, taking reluctant steps to protect women, acting as a spectator instead of offering protection, and at times even returning the victim to her hazardous environment. The courts also are far too lenient and fail to understand the power structure that causes women to ask for reconciliation and leniency for their violent husbands (Halawi, 2014; Gal, 2003).

Shalhoub-Kevorkian (1999) points out that the problems with the implementation of the Israeli law against family violence in Palestinian society in Israel stem from the difficulties of applying a Western legal framework to traditional, collective, Arab-Muslim culture, in which social harmony takes precedence over confrontation, and in which family problems are handled by the family elders and disgraceful situations are resolved internally. Shalhoub-Kevorkian argues, based on interviews with dozens of Arab welfare workers, women activists, and law enforcement officials, that Israeli law has ignored the existing informal systems – the cultural resources that exist in Arab society to assist women exposed to violence – and in this way has left the women completely exposed. Jewish police officers interviewed by Shalhoub-Kevorkian stated that the importance of the family in Palestinian society restricts their ability to help battered women. Indeed, Kandalaft and Rohana (1997, p. 65) note that “Most judges, as well as the police, continue to regard this problem as the private concern of the family and as a phenomenon that stems from the social norms and values of traditional Palestinian society.” As a result, many Arab respondents viewed the law itself and its sporadic implementation by Israeli authorities as a continuation of the policies of “divide and rule” and general discrimination against them, causing them to oppose the law (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 1999); in one case Arab leaders even opposed opening a new shelter for Arab battered women (Gal, 2003, p.111-112). On the other side of the spectrum, Arab women’s organizations feel that the law cannot be implemented properly due to the lack of resources, lack of trained personnel, and dearth of police and judges that understand the difficulties and circumstances of battered Arab women (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 1999).

Clearly the obstacles facing those attempting to help Arab women who are victims of violence are numerous and concern both Palestinian society and the Israeli state. Understanding the arena in which violence

against Arab women occurs and in which the women' organizations act, also requires a basic understanding of the legal situation in Israel, which will now be detailed.

### **Israeli Law**

Following intense and constant pressure by women's organizations in Israel in the past three decades, the Knesset has passed several laws that have improved, at least legally, the outlook for women who are victims of violence. The first and most important law is the Law for the Prevention of Violence in the Family, which was passed in 1991. This law allows courts to issue an immediate restraining order for the protection of threatened women, including the ability to order the husband away from the home, forbidding him to possess firearms, and to harass or threaten the woman. In the past such injunctions were not issued when the couple had already begun legal procedures, which is often the case, and the procedure for issuing them was lengthy and cumbersome. Generally, the new law made it much easier for the victim or her representative to get an injunction against the husband. As a result, there was a large increase in the issuance of such injunctions (Gal, 2003). In 2002 a new law doubled the punishment for domestic violence and for violating a court order forbidding any threats to the woman. Over the years, several laws were passed that increased the financial assistance provided by the state to battered woman and their children. For instance in 2005 a law was promulgated providing women who were transferring from a shelter to an apartment with money for furniture, and in the year 2000 a law was passed that protected the rights of working women who had to leave to a shelter, forbidding the employer to fire the woman. A 2001 law turned threatening harassment into a felony worthy of three years of prison (Na'amat, N.D.).

According to Gal (2003, p.21), the general attitude toward women in Israel is ambiguous. On the one hand one finds very advanced, pro-feminist legislation, while on the other, women still experience discrimination in all areas of life. Regarding the law for the prevention of violence against women, Gal states that it is simply not implemented fully or properly by the authorities, which tend to be understanding and lenient towards men who are violent toward women. This is the case for both Jewish and Arab women but as mentioned, Arab women are discriminated twice over – both by their own (patriarchal) society and

by the (patriarchal) state itself. Therefore the task of Arab (and Jewish) women in Israel – individuals as well as organizations – has been to reduce the gap between the letter of the law and its implementation.

### **Acting Against Violence : Initiatives in Arab-Israeli Society**

In the 1990s several feminist organizations were established in Arab-Israeli society to combat violence against women and they have made numerous contributions to improve the situation of Arab women (Biady-Shlon, 2014). The following is only a partial list of organizations and initiatives.

Woman against Violence (WAV) was one of the first feminist organizations to focus on combating violence against Arab women. It is a non-political organization, established in 1992 in Nazareth by Arab professionals in order to provide services, raise awareness to the problem, and advocate for change in Arab and Jewish society (Woman against Violence, N.D.) It is also part of the SALMA Network that combats violence against women in the Arab world (HBS, 2013). The Interagency Taskforce on Israeli Arab Issues (2014) lists WAV along with Kayan and Assiwar as the prominent Arab organizations dealing with violence against Arab women in Israel. Kayan and Assiwar are both based in Haifa and were established in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Assiwar operates an emergency hotline but its main focus is on educational projects that raise awareness. Kayan is focused on empowering Arab women and raising their status and awareness, and fostering women's leadership. Throughout the years it has fostered numerous local grassroots organizations, some of which combat violence against women (Abdu, 2009). In 2007 Kayan published a leaflet on the Law against Domestic Violence, translating parts of the law and explaining, in Arabic, the rights of women. This leaflet was disseminated in social welfare offices, universities, schools, and other public spaces and caused a great uproar and much debate (Kayan, 2011). These NGOs and several others operate 24 hour hotlines for the benefit of abused women, which are mostly independently funded (though some funds are received from the state). In addition to the two shelters provided by the state, some NGOs, such as Woman against Violence (WAV) and the Haifa Women's Crisis Shelter, operate their own shelters, which are either fully or partially subsidized by the state. The Haifa Rape Crisis Center, The Haifa Battered Women's Hotline, and Women Against Violence



began implementing workshops in the 1990s to train police officers who work in Arab communities, instructing them on the special needs of victims of abuse (Kandalaft & Rohana, 1997).

Thus, Arab organizations attempt to fill the gap between the insufficient services provided by the state and the needs of abused Arab women. In addition, these organizations continuously lobby the government, and stage protests and demonstration to change policies that are harmful to Arab women (and women in general). For instance, a significant achievement was the ban, implemented in 2011, against the use of the term "family honor" by the state authorities to excuse or explain away violence against women in the Arab community. The ban means that violence against Arab women is on the same level of any other type of violence, which is the feminist position on the matter (Biady-Shlon, 2014).

Initiatives to combat violence against Arab women also exist outside of the Arab feminist organizations. Thus, The Abraham Fund, a Jewish-Arab NGO aiming to build a shared future for both peoples, recently completed a new pilot program, devised by Dr. Rajda El-Nablussi, to train activists and professionals who deal with violence against women in Arab society. The goal of this program is to provide information regarding the specific context of Arab society and tools to work within it in a systematic manner in order to assist battered women in ways that can help them in their context. The pilot was conducted in Ramleh and presented to the representatives of the municipality and the police (Abraham Fund, 2014). A similar program is being developed in Iksal, an Arab village in the Galilee. The project is headed by Emil Samaan, chairman of the Arab Welfare Department Heads Forum, who says that existing interventions are based on Western models, which cannot apply successfully to a completely different culture. The project consists of professionals discussing current cases and reaching conclusions as to the best ways to deal with them. One conclusion is that religious figures must be taken into account when dealing with violence against women, both for prevention, raising awareness, and to deal with concrete problems (Wieller-Polk, 2014).

Have these initiatives actually improved the situation for abused Arab women? This is difficult to say. Clearly, there is much more awareness than ever before and much more willingness to discuss the issue in the

public arena, which is for the good. Much more complaints are being submitted by Arab women and the complaints are being submitted more quickly – closer to the actual event – than before, and more women are seeking help than ever before. This seems to indicate that the increased awareness is being translated into action by abused women (Huri, 2012; Shani, 2013). Ynet (Senior, 2013) reports on a unique initiative that I think would never have occurred a decade ago, but which demonstrates how far we have advanced. It appears that in the year 2012, no Arab women were murdered in Lod (a mixed city near Tel Aviv) as opposed to four in 2011. This is attributed to a new program instituted by the commander of police of the Central District, who says that he is determined to show Arab society that the police will help those who cooperate with it. The result in this case is that a police car has been stationed for the past year next to the house of an abused woman who is under constant threat by her husband. The program includes a special team assigned to such cases to gather information, a social worker, a restraining order to the husband, and contact with elements within the family that can help. The commander states that “there is zero tolerance for threatening women”, and that he insists on almost constant daily contact with the women’s family and constant contact with the threatening husband, “in order to prevent the next murder”. Regardless of the actual effectiveness or suitability of such an approach, this kind of proactive attitude on the part of Israeli police would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

## **Conclusion**

Clearly, the Arab feminist organizations in Israel have made significant achievements in the past two decades and the outlook for further gains is positive. Yet many challenges remain. Funding remains a fundamental problem as does enforcing the law and gaining the cooperation of the Arab communal authorities to combat this phenomenon (Biady-Shlon, 2014). A recent analysis of the 2009 state budget showed that 456 million NS were allocated to dealing with domestic violence, constituting a mere 0.12 percent of the budget. Eighty percent of this sum was spent on the enforcement and punishment of offenders, as opposed to 20 percent allocated to the defense and rehabilitation of the victims. An estimated 2 percent were allocated to educational purposes (Midot, 2010). Education is a problem, as evidenced by a recent survey conducted by Dr. Jinan

Faraj Falah, head of the Gender Department at the Haifa Academic College, which found that 20% of the students of education who were surveyed justified honor killings; 88% of the students were women (Wieller-Polk, 2014). This is significant, considering that these students are going to be teachers and set the example for other children.

In my mind education must be a priority, since preventing the problem is far more effective than treating the offenders and victims. Only a radical change in the attitudes towards women in Arab-Israeli society can eliminate the physical and psychological violence that women are constantly subjected to. However, this kind of change cannot be imposed from without, by the state; it must be willingly constructed from within. To me, this remains the most challenging task in the struggle to eliminate violence against Arab women in Israel.

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## **POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN EGYPT**

*Hoda RAGHEB AWAD*

You shine upon the world like an immortal sun, you women are the seed of all creation.

### **Introduction**

Egyptian women play an eminent role in society as they constitute half of the progressive present and the whole of the promising future. Egyptian women have always enjoyed an exquisite place as a result of the demographic increase of women that has reached 48.80 percent according to the survey conducted in the year 1986. The percentage has moreover, mounted to 48.83 in the year 1996 and has maintained this increase till 2005.

At the political level, Egyptian women have always been warring for their rights since the rise of the political currents in order to prove their political existence. The political arena is considered the most prominent field where women have been struggling for self-fulfillment and realization, thus, women's political role is considered an unsurmountable corner stone for many studies and researches where the issue of women political participation mounts on top of the list of priorities of the agenda of Egyptian women.

Based on this fact, this study aims at capturing and analyzing the Egyptian women political status in Egypt as well as addressing the political violence practiced against women to shut them out from the political practices, especially accompanied by the progress that took place in 2010 before the 25th of January Revolution, that was witnessed in the political arena in the form of the decree issued by the People's Council to allocate 64 seats for women in the Parliament.

The first topic tackles the cases of violence performed against Egyptian women to prevent them from participating in the popular uprising as equal partners to men expressing their demands for freedom and dignity and social justice. There are new strategies adopted by the Egyptian police to combat violence, yet there is an urgent need to ensure societal collective actions to crackdown on violence against women.

The second topic or theme addresses capturing and analyzing the percentages of women's political participation in the Parliament since the right of political participation was granted to women in the first constitution drafted by Gamal Abdel Naser in 1954. The aim is to understand how women have or have not progressed in self-assurance and acquiring a political persona.

The number of rape and sexual harassment incidents carried out by armed groups has increased, especially during the political gatherings and demonstrations that took place during the 25th of January 2011 Revolution. Indeed, the Egyptian Media played an eminent role in shedding light upon such heightening violence incidents against women.

Some might claim that such violence is only limited to physical hurt, ignoring the fact that it is a long term planned violence that reaches all aspects of the political situation on women's part in Egypt. Thus, Egyptian women participate actively in the political life only as a voter for a male leadership. Such reality is a direct result for the worn out customs and traditions that impede women from running for a leading position.

The anti-harassment campaigns always hold up mottos such as "Say No to Sexual Harassment," had the issue of political participation enjoyed such media attention that is allocated to sexual harassment and rape cases, the map of the Egyptian women's political and social affairs would have been totally changed. However, it's worth mentioning that the outstanding role of media in casting light on the horrid impact of physical hurt caused by sexual harassment has urged the political institution to force penalties that could reach death sentence for the rapiers and such convicts.

The Egyptian police force's new strategy includes an increase in the number of patrols for quick intervention and response to emergency calls regarding any violence against women. Moreover, more female physicians have been hired and new sections within police stations have been formed to receive victims of violence and assault.

Despite the fact that a special unit for fighting violence against women has been formed by the Ministry of Interior since 2013, that includes tens of women police officers who are especially trained for such specific situations, the absence of a complete vision about the role of

such special unit, in addition to the inability to generalize its existence in all the Egyptian governorates has impeded its effective role.

Recognizing that this strategy would not work without greater awareness of women's issues, the Ministry of Interior has added a section in the police Academy's curriculum about human rights and violence against women. The section in the curriculum will include information on the implications of violence against women and mechanisms to confront it. In an effort to crackdown on violence against women and sexual harassment, the National Council of women has proposed the establishment of special tribunals and judicial departments. According to Ambassador Mervat AlTollawy, the president of the NCW, the proposed tribunals are part of a strategy that has been formulated to tackle violence against women. In June 2014, Egypt introduced new laws targeting sexual harassment. Previously Egypt had no law forbidding sexual harassment.

Violence practiced against women in the political arena is only a small portion of the violence practiced against, not only women, but the entire community. Oftentimes, the political violence is caused by the disputes over authority, aiming at excluding other powers inside the community. As previously mentioned, political violence is inflicted upon women to segregate them from the political arena and to avoid political participation. Such is evident as up to five hundred cases of sexual harassment were reported aiming at shutting women out of taking part in public issues. The cases were reported and captured by an international institution named The International Federation for Human Rights and the New Women Federation. Those cases were added to the cases that were reported back in the year 2005 and 2010 and during the 25th of January Revolution.

Al Ahram daily published an article about the impediments that hinder women's political participation. An example of such obstacles might be multiple interpretations of laws that might state that women cannot take part in public issues, or such laws could be used to humiliate the system's opposition or to subdue the male relatives and of such women participants. In addition, such twisted laws could be seen by civil community organizations including syndicates. Moreover, thuggery prevails in the elections times forming a colossal obstacle that restrained women from participating in the electoral process either as runners or voters.



The report issued by “Maat” Institution admits that some families can practice political violence against women in the family, as wives, daughters, or sisters, either by preventing them from running for elections as it is considered a right granted only to men, or by forcing them to vote for a specific candidate that is favored by the family. Thus, violence alters women’s political participation into mere political mobilization not actual participation. Additionally, the civil community organizations such as parties and syndicates practice violence against women by imposing barriers and impediments in women’s paths towards holding leading positions in such parties and syndicates. Moreover, parties do abstain from voting for and supporting women who try to run as candidates in such parties. This sheer antagonism was evident in the latest elections of Shura (Consultative) Council in 2013 where women’s general abstinence from running as candidates in many electoral constituencies resulted from their inability to compete against male counterparts and the extreme sense fear of losing the Parliament seats, in addition to the immature communal and political culture that fails to contain women power.

### ***Participation of Egyptian Women in Political life***

#### **Historical Background**

March 16, 1919 will always be marked as the first day when the Egyptian women, led by Huda Sharaawy, started fighting for attaining their political rights. Ever since, the Egyptian women are consistent in doing charity work for many charity organizations such as the Red Crescent, thus assuring that the Egyptians are indeed equal, women to men.

January 1924; also led by Huda Sharaawy, women’s persistent trials to participate into the first Parliament formed after imposing the British Protection and Guardianship over Egypt in 1882. In such persistence, Egyptian women never stopped calling for their right to participate in the Parliament formed in 1944, through the era after the Revolution that took place on July 1952, women insisted on running as candidates and on voting. However, such emancipation current was met by the dogmatic Arab mindset that is dominated by the parental chauvinistic power of men over women.

## ***The Concept of Equality among Men and Women***

The Constitution put in 1954 granted women all their rights to run as candidates and vote.

Capturing and analyzing the evolution that the Egyptian women political participation process has witnessed in the Parliament formed in 1924 when the Egyptian Feminist Union submitted a petition to the head of the Senators and members of Parliament demanding the amendment of the elections law to guarantee women's participation and sharing the same electoral rights as men. The first Arab Feminist Convention was held in Cairo in 1938. The 1940s of the Twentieth century has witnessed a rise at the level of awareness among women as embodied in the political aspect that distinguished the women's movement. Various feminist groups were formed to defend women's rights and claim their participation in the political arena. On March 12th 1954, a group of women, who belong to the "Daughter of the Nile" party, organized a sit inside the Journalists' Syndicate and went on a food strike in demand for the complete granting of women's political rights.

As a result of these relentless efforts, the political elite started to give due attention to the Egyptian women's demands, thus a ray of hope started to radiate indicating a hope for full acquisition of rights. None the less, this acquisition was done in long stages that are still on going. Women's struggle could be claimed to have passed by four basic stages of empowerment:

### **First Stage : 1956-1979**

In 1956, six women ran for Parliament seats and two women won. In November 1962' the socialist decrees were issued to empower women's representation to reach 5 percent of the total number of the members of the Pan Arab Convention of People's Forces who counted up to 1500 members.

On July 1964, along with launching the Socialist Union, the system guaranteed the involvement of women in various authorities especially in the women's committees in Cairo where the women's committees' activities were held based on the basic Social Union Units.

On September 7th 1976, it was decided to establish the feminist formation of the Socialist Union, which constituted the seed for

women's participation in the three venues that late president Mohamad Anwar AlSadat decided to establish in 1976. Such venues were transformed into political parties number (40) in 1977. Moreover, the legislative and legal structure during this phase has constituted basic frameworks in the journey of the Egyptian women's political life as the amendment of the elections law number 38 for the year 1972 resulted in issuing the law number 22 for the year 1979, thus, allocating three seats for women, as a minimum number; additionally, allocating at least one seat for the governorates of biggest population number. For competition over such seats, this action has resulted in 200 women running for candidates in the elections held in 1979 and thirty women won their allocated seats and additional three seats that are not allocated for them. Additionally, the President has assigned two women on the list of ten members that the President is entitled to assign in a percentage mounting to 8% of the total number of members.

### **Second Stage**

This stage was relatively calm and despite canceling the allocated seats to women in the People's Council, the representation percentage remained high to reach 3.9 percent which amounts to 18 women representatives among 456 members in the Parliament formed in 1987 as a result of using the relative party listing system where the party lists used to include some women candidates. This system seized as the application of the individual elections system resumed which resulted in minimizing the number of women in subsequent times. Shortly after, the danger stared at the face of the journey of the women political struggle when the percentage of women representation decreased to 1.8% of the members.

### **Third Stage : 2009**

This stage represents a new start for the feminist struggle to prove the political entity as this phase was crowned by issuing law number 49 for the year 2009 pertinent to increasing the number of electoral constituencies and allocating seats for women, specifically 64 seats, while keeping it possible to run for candidates for public seats. All the eyes were focused on what will the new women representatives achieve in the coming Parliament Round in the year 2010 to break new records in empowering Egyptian women in the Parliament elections.

It is evident that allocating such big quota for women as decreed by the People's Council, and keeping the possibility of running for the public seats would trigger a remarkable start and an unprecedented boom as this is considered a huge opportunity for women political self-assertion. This decree repeats the same scenario drawn by the law number 21 for the year 1979 which allocated 30 seats for women in the Parliament as a minimum number for each governorate.

#### **Fourth Stage : Post Arab Spring Movements in 2011**

Should it ever be necessary to clarify that the Egyptian women's situation after the 25th of January Revolution is close enough to be described as "the long awaited un reaped fruits" !? All of the feats that were once achieved by the warring Egyptian women have been withdrawn, moreover, obstacles were put on their way such as the absence of the techniques and programs and mechanisms that empower women, and the increase in the number of violence directed to Egyptian women. Through the mass media findings about the women affaires in Egypt, nearly 189 cases of corporal assault and sexual harassment cases were reported in addition to the cases under investigation such as Mervat Moussa's case who was assaulted and slapped by a Muslim Brotherhood member during covering the events in Al Mukattam neighborhood. Additionally, the sexual assault incidents that took place in Tahrir Square mainly aimed at frightening women away from participating in the protests and demonstrations against bias and fanaticism against women in order to withdraw women's political merits granted as seats especially during the elections held in 2010.

Amidst the poor economic conditions that women try to survive, as about 25 percent of families are supported by women only thus, women find themselves mainly engaged in providing for the families and improving their living conditions apart from political practices.

Egyptian women's situation does not reflect their potentials and capabilities in launching the process of development and State construction and hence, President Mohamad Morsi initiated the process of women empowerment and acquisition of rights for a three months long campaign. On Sunday 24th of March 2013, the Convention for Egyptian Women Empowerment was held after the 25th of January Revolution. The question is whether there is a political will to empower this initiative as it was definitely easier to enact it through the new

Constitution, or has the Egyptian women's situation really deteriorated due to the following factors :

Weak political and legal awareness level has caused the illiteracy rate amongst women to reach 64 percent in 2012, additionally, the unemployment rates rose to 22.7 percent, the supporting mothers rate mounted to 16 percent, and divorced women's rate escalated to 86 percent in urban cities and 69 percent in rural areas. Moreover, women's political intended exclusion from the constitution, also allocating the secondary position only to women in the list according to the relative lists elections laws where they run for elections in electoral areas where men do not compete.

There is women representation in the political parties however, it is more of a quantitative unreal representation than a qualitative actual representation as I assure as a member of the Supreme Authority of the Free Egyptians Party on behalf of women.

### ***The Image of the Egyptian Women in the International Studies and Unions***

The studies conducted by the International Parliamentary Union in 2008 have revealed the situation of women in 188 countries around the world where Egypt came in the position 134 concerning the women's participation in the Parliament as the participation percentage reached only 2 percent. Conversely, each of Rwanda, the Sudan and Cuba rank in the first, second and third places respectively. This clarifies how deteriorated the women situation is in where Egypt ranks at the 124 to 130 position at the women empowerment level among the countries that were approached by this report.

The United Nations has expressed concerns about the declaration made by the Muslim Brotherhood party pertaining to the anti-violence against women decree and the National council for women has sent another declaration that refutes the former declaration of the Brotherhood party that has added new items in the original declaration document such as items and conditions related to inheritance, allowing Muslim women's marriage to non-Muslim men, granting the homosexual community its full rights, in addition to granting women who work in prostitution full rights as equally granted to legally married women.

Obstacles that hinder the empowerment of Arab and Egyptian women and their representation in parliament are embodied in the everlastingly traditional view of the gender roles of men and women in the Arab societies, in addition to the total rejection of women participation in any political field, especially on part of the young members of the Islamic torrents. Another factor is the gender discrimination practiced inside families favoring males over females which enhance the unfair traditional sense of male superiority.

In a nutshell, there is a serious dysfunction in the balance between the constitutional rights and the social and legal reality, especially after the Arab Spring Revolution phase when the Fundamental Rightists powers surfaced on the political arena in Egypt and other Arab countries as such powers endeavor excluding the moderate, cultured and the enlightened elite and segregating them.

### ***Recommendation***

The issue of political violence against women should be given more vital concern on the part of the concerned academic cadres who are concerned with women and human rights. Additionally, a system of indexes constantly measuring the state and forms of violence must be established to enforce maximized penalties on electoral crimes committed against women, to provide sufficient guarantees for women to escape family or tribal pressures, and to offer psychological help and legal aid to women who are victims of political violence.

How can the Arab and Egyptian women's participation be empowered and strengthened? The civil society plays a vital role in that empowerment especially the feminist organizations. Moreover, establishing an independent national authority that is mainly concerned with the cases involving political violence against women is another means of empowering women. Moreover, groups of national organizations and political parties can initiate establishing such authorities.



## **VIOLENCE, A NEBULOUS SOCIETAL MUTATION AFTER THE "ARAB SPRING"**

*Hela KOCHBATI*

### **Violence and Peace, Two Ways and Two Horizons**

"Violence is often an enactment of impotence", says the French psycho-sociologist and writer Jacques Salomé. Adolescents account for 15 percent of the population of the Arab region; they are surrounded by wars, if not in conflict situations or situations that risk degenerating into armed conflict. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Women in Tunisia in 2011, the young Tunisian youth are unanimously for peace; however, they are sensitive to the humiliation suffered by the Palestinians, Syrians and Iraqis. Moreover, their love for peace is torpedoed by a sense of frustration and powerlessness, augmented by the lack of resources for effective action in Palestine, Iraq, and Syria. For this reason, it is imperative to provide these young adolescents an enabling framework that can help them make sense of their wishes and aspirations.

On the other hand, in some regions of the world, many women victims of violence will not report to the police or testify in front of a judge for fear of creating a political problem between two tribes, ethnic groups, political parties, etc. Because of this, women continue to be subject to inequality, injustice, and discriminations. In Iraq in 2003, Syria since 2011 and until now in 2015, hundreds of women are abducted, raped and are victims of crimes of honor if they return to their tribes. In the same geographical context and being less suspected than men, women are forced to travel to identify the bodies of their relatives, and do it in order to avoid a series of armed violence and death threats to men of their regions.

### **Women Victims of Wars and Conflicts : an Alarming Situation**

Generally, in time of peace, when the husband dies, it is the woman who must take over to become the head of the family, with all what this implies in terms of responsibilities and risks. However, in times of war and conflict, women in this situation often become as cruel as men because they often think of revenge. So, women force themselves not to appear vulnerable, unable to meet their needs and those of their families, including their protection. But that does



not prevent or hide the fact that whether in peace or in wartime, the constraints on women needs are different from those on men. What is meant here is the socio-cultural context of the Arab region where patriarchy is the norm. This fact exacerbates women's fragility. Many victims of sexual crimes are not supported by adequate care, measures after the act of rape to prevent sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, etc. It is imperative to enlighten women and adolescent girls, to educate, to teach them to act quickly in various dramatic circumstances of conflict and violence and find solutions to long-term problems. Substantial work remains to be done in this particular area. "I object to violence because when it appears to generate the good, the good that results is a transitional product, while the evil is permanent." (Gandhi).

### **Violence against Women in Tunisia : Figures and Numbers**

According to a study by the National Office of Family and Population (ONFP) with the assistance of Spanish cooperation on gender and violence against women, two victims a day visit the "urgency section" of Charles Nicolle hospital in Tunis, the capital. These women are usually abused by their spouse. According to several surveys presented by ONFP on the theme "Violence within the family": 55 percent of battered women visit the hospital 2-4 times a year, of whom 11.2 percent seriously affected: fractures, wounds that required in most cases stitches, abortion, psychiatric help, etc. According to these surveys, the aggressors are husbands, mothers-in-law, sisters, or even sons, and 81.2 percent of violence occurs in the home, 12.5 percent in a public place and 5.6 percent in the workplace. Thus, physical violence is the most common type in the intimate sphere (often perpetrated by husbands, fiancés, friends, etc.) and is therefore the first in which a woman undergoes physical violence after the family space (where perpetrators are often fathers, brothers, other men in the family), as the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Family, Children and the elderly reported in a study titled "Violence in the family is present in different social groups." Intimate partner is the author of physical violence in 47.2 percent of cases of psychological violence in 68.5 percent, 78.2 percent in sexual violence and economic violence in 77.9 percent of cases The National Survey on violence against women conducted between 2005 and 2012 combined quantitative and qualitative approach to estimate the frequency of gender-based violence: verbal abuse, physical,

psychological, sex and socioeconomic experienced by women in their different living environment: the family, the couple, the public sphere and the professional sphere. It covered the entire Tunisian population during the period of the rise of Islamists and the overthrow of the Tunisian Benali regime. A total of 3873 women were surveyed, of whom 68.1 percent live in urban areas. The results of this survey show that 47.6 percent among women aged 18-64 years reported experiencing at least one form of violence in their lifetime. The survey also reveals a lack of statistically significant difference between urban and rural areas and contrary to the widespread views and clichés; the level of education is not statistically associated with violence. Over 20,000 legal sentences have been recorded in the last five years.

### **Universal Effects of Violence: an Overview**

“Violence is not always striking, but it still hurts” evokes the Canadian director Richard Leclerc. Violence is the result of historical, cultural, social and political factors that are perpetuated and often allowed to “go unpunished.” The weight of history, traditions and patriarchal customs continue to rage and implemented over the last decade. Despite the evolution of technologies, attitudes and behavior have not changed in several areas of the North African region. Violence against women is a phenomenon that has long been denied, hidden, camouflaged or simply accepted. This violence has recently been subject to mobilization by civil society and international associations and organizations. According to these associations and organizations, women and girls experience violence disproportionately in times of peace as in time of war. These acts may be committed by the state, the social group or family. Everywhere, in homes, in public and private spheres such as in areas of conflict and war, violence needs to stop as civil society strives to assert.

When a woman is abused, it is virtually all aspects of her life that can be shaken: her psychic and mental health, ability to work, her relationship with her children, members of her family and friends, as well as personal perception of self-esteem. Sometimes her efforts to deal with the situation turn into consuming alcohol or drugs, accumulating additional problems. Ultimately, in some cases, women are killed by their violent partners and this is true of 77 percent of women murdered according to the latest report by the World Health Organization (WHO). In Europe, the number of victims of abuse in the

home was estimated at 800,000 women abused annually, according to the International Amnesty report in 2011. In the United States of America, every 15 seconds a woman is beaten by her spouse. And according to statistics from the Department of American justice, a woman is raped every 90 minutes. In Spain, two million women have been abused, according to results of a study by the Women's Institute. In Arab countries, the figures are as alarming for violence within the family where 35 percent of Egyptian women have been reported beaten by their spouses. In Morocco, violence affects 88 percent of Moroccan women. Surveys under the theme "violence against women in Jordanian society" revealed a relationship between the torturer and the victim with a percentage of 64.8 percent; where the brother constitutes 29.5 percent, the spouse 28.6 percent, and the father 22.3 percent. In Algeria in 2011, physical aggression affected 5179 women as victims of sexual violence, 34 women were murdered, and 1,753 were abused. And the numbers are becoming more and more alarming. The tragic effects of violence against women call for urgent intervention to lessen the severity of this phenomenon. "Violence leads to no lasting hope. Only the temporary relief of a permanent decline," said the American diplomat Kingman Brewster Junior.

## **Conclusion**

In Tunisia, violence against women does not seem to be dramatized after the revolution; Tunisian women seem to be much less affected than women in other countries where the numbers of battered women are truly alarming whether in Arab countries or in the West. But the phenomenon of violence exists and we must fight against the various forms of discrimination and inequalities with laws enforcement and the establishment of new social relations based on equality before law and respect for each other. Moreover, education as a universal right that should be stressed more than ever. This right is essential because it allows girls to grow and learn, but also to become independent, make their own choices and confront various forms of violence in a cool way.

## **ALGÉRIE ENTRE SÉCULARISME ET SALAFISME PROJET DE LOI SUR LA VIOLENCE CONTRE LES FEMMES**

*Rachid TIEMCANI*

### **Introduction**

C'est pour se débarrasser du joug patriarcal que les femmes arabes sont descendues en masse dans la rue ces dernières années. Les femmes de toutes conditions sociales sont sorties spontanément de leur domicile pour dénoncer toutes les formes de discriminations. Le Printemps arabe a clairement montré qu'il existe un nouveau modèle de mobilisation contre les mentalités archaïques et rétrogrades. Nombre d'entre elles ont été victimes durant ces manifestations de menaces, parfois proférées par leur propre famille, d'autres ont même été violées, voire assassinées. En dépit de toutes ces violences, elles ont fait preuve d'une grande détermination et d'un courage politique extraordinaire.

Paradoxalement, le phénomène de violence contre les femmes et jeunes filles s'est accentué au lendemain du Printemps arabe en Algérie et dans les autres pays de la région. La violence extrême a augmenté dans la sphère privée qu'aussi bien dans la sphère publique. Des groupes salafistes, wahabites, jihadistes et autres intégristes sèment la terreur dans plusieurs villes et villages. La construction d'un nouvel ordre social appartenant à une époque révolue semble être l'objectif ultime de ces groupes. Les autorités publiques ont réagi à cette violence souvent très timidement et d'une manière contradictoire.

Sous la contrainte des groupes féministes, d'une part et d'autre, de la pression internationale, le gouvernement Algérien a promulgué une loi criminalisant la violence contre les femmes. Ce projet de loi a soulevé une vive polémique au sein du parlement composé de plus d'un tiers de femmes. Les groupes salafistes bien qu'ils ne soient pas reconnus en tant que tels ainsi que d'autres groupes conservateurs se sont opposés énergiquement à ce projet. Si la lutte anti-terroriste a vaincu militairement les groupes islamiques, ce ne fut pas le cas pour l'islamisme en tant que courant idéologique.

## Le salafisme algérien

Le salafisme, une tendance de l'islam sunnite, se réclame du retour à l'islam des origines par l'imitation de la vie du Prophète et de ses compagnons. Ses adeptes partent du présupposé que l'islam est altéré et qu'il est temps d'en restaurer la pureté. Ils prônent delà une lecture littérale du Coran et de la Sunna. Ils multiplient les «haram», ce qui n'est pas licite. Ils vont jusqu'à édicter tous les comportements que doit avoir le bon musulman, de sa tenue vestimentaire aux secrets de sa vie intime. Le salafisme, tous courants confondus, a pris un nouveau souffle avec l'afflux des pétrodollars du Golfe persique. Tous les moyens sont jugés légitimes pour lutter contre le nationalisme progressiste et laïc qui a instauré l'égalité entre l'homme et la femme dans plusieurs domaines. Il condamne toute influence occidentale, comme le mode de vie et la société de consommation, mais également la démocratie et la laïcité. Rappelons qu'au lendemain des indépendances des Etats du Maghreb, il était encore impensable qu'un courant salafiste puisse traverser notre région tant que son discours est contraire à l'islam maghrébin qui a contribué à libération de la région du colonialisme français.

Le statut du code personnel que le président Habib Bourguiba a promulgué, dès son élection en 1956, reste jusqu'à aujourd'hui le plus libéral et progressiste dans le monde arabe. Cette loi a œuvré à l'instauration de l'égalité entre l'homme et la femme dans plusieurs secteurs. Ce code a supprimé entre autre la polygamie alors que le code Algérien l'a entérinée en 2005. Cette loi a grandement contribué à l'éclosion dans les années 2000 d'une société civile vibrante et forte, le fer de lance de la modernité politique. Si ce n'était pas la vigilance de la femme, l'islamisme sous la houlette de Rachid Ghannouchi, aurait réussi à renvoyer la femme au foyer.

En Algérie la situation de la femme s'est considérablement dégradée ces dernières années avec notamment l'apparition des groupes salafistes. La plus grande partie des salafistes algériens des années 1980 et 1990 a bénéficié d'une formation en Arabie Saoudite. Très peu d'Algériens sont devenus salafistes par hasard. Les jeunes étudiants qui sont partis en Egypte et en Syrie ont été rapidement séduits par le discours salafiste ou wahabite. Ce discours populiste fait d'un tissu de demi-vérités et de mensonges trouve un terrain de prédilection dans les conflits armés au MENA. Le mécréant doit être

combattu par tous les moyens, y compris la violence. Les Algériens seront au premier rang des candidats au djihad en Afghanistan pour combattre les troupes soviétiques dans les années 1980. Ils se tourneront vers un cursus religieux auprès de prestigieux savants afin d'acquérir un savoir défiant les frontières et les traditions. Une idée nouvelle apparaît selon laquelle les musulmans sont en guerre contre l'Occident. Les groupes islamiques, toutes tendances confondues, vilipendent l'Occident comme gage de fidélité à leur orthodoxie islamique. Pourtant nombreux sont les islamistes, simples militants ou leaders (de Djamel el Dine al Afghani à Ghanouchi en passant par l'ayatallah Khomeini) qui ont trouvé refuge, le salut, en Europe et aux USA. Aujourd'hui encore des millions de musulmans fuient la barbarie de l'islamisme et le despotisme obscurantiste non pas vers la terre musulmane mais vers la terre chrétienne où ils profitent du respect des droits de l'homme et de la liberté de conscience qu'ils n'auraient jamais appliqué chez eux. Si les armes se sont tuées ces derniers temps, la salafiya dite «scientifique» ou «prédicative» tient une place non négligeable dans la société algérienne.

Le mot «Sahoua» revient régulièrement dans le discours pour dire qu'il y a un sommeil, une léthargie. Il est grand temps par conséquent de se réveiller. Les salafistes algériens détenant des blogs mettent en ligne des opinions et échanges avec les stars de la salafya. Il n'est plus nécessaire désormais d'aller jusqu'à l'université de Médine pour s'imprégner de l'idéologie salafiste. Il suffit seulement d'écrire un message aux idéologues via les réseaux sociaux. Dans certains cas, des imams, employés au ministère des Affaires religieuses, font appel à des salafistes étrangers pour légitimer des kotba, des discours, au lieu de consulter la hiérarchie administrative. L'absence d'autorité de l'Etat sur ces imams est devenue problématique ces derniers temps. Les pouvoirs publics algériens y voient de sérieux concurrents remettant en question de facto le discours officiel qui se veut respectueux de l'histoire et des valeurs et traditions locales. Le référent religieux national est inspiré de l'islam de Cordoue. Le ministre des Affaires religieuses a exprimé à plusieurs fois sa détermination à soustraire les mosquées à l'influence des imams salafistes. Ces derniers contrôlent plus de 20 pour cent des 17.000 mosquées existantes à travers le territoire national. « Il y a une offensive idéologique pour retirer les jeunes de leur couveuse religieuse et patriotique et les orienter vers une croyance

hypothétique incarnée par Daech» (acronyme arabe du groupe État Islamique), estime le ministre.

En fin observateur, le chroniqueur du journal, Le Quotidien d'Oran, a décrit admirablement cet univers kafkaïen : « Partout : «prières» en rimes accrochées aux murs, photocopies des architectures de la Mecque ou de versets entrelacées, «hadiths», «sagesses», petits dépliants, invocations contre le «mauvais œil», «rappels divins», dépliants ( El Matwiaate, petits fascicules de fatwa, format pouce ) etc., la religion des reliques prend l'espace des administrations algériennes. On ne s'étonne plus de retrouver sur les murs des bureaux publics, derrière les chaises et sur les vitres des guichets, ces «islamiseries» en conquête des espaces communs, sous la légitimité du religieux comme sujet exclu du débat et de la législation. La religion étant au-dessus de la loi et des règlements intérieurs et personne ne peut prétendre à l'autorité de la contestation. Le responsable qui osera dire à l'employé que cela est interdit, est accusé de le dire à Dieu et risque donc la stigmatisation. Le phénomène est aujourd'hui massif, peu discret et personne ne s'en offusque ».

### **La vague de violence symbolique contre les femmes et les jeunes filles**

La violence symbolique n'est ni un processus d'influence ni de manipulation. C'est une croyance collective qui permet de maintenir les hiérarchies sociales. Elle dissimule de ce fait, les rapports de force qui sous-tendent la hiérarchie sociale. La violence symbolique consacre l'ordre établi comme légitime. Elle sert à pacifier les relations au sein de la structure sociale qui sont devenues très contrariées et antagonistes au fur et à mesure du développement de l'économie de bazar. Les élites traditionnelles dans les pays musulmans soutiennent évidemment cette forme de violence puisqu'elle renforce le staut quo ambiant du néo-patrimonialisme devenu un mode de gouvernance généralisé.

La violence symbolique est plus problématique que la violence physique. Elle passe pratiquement inaperçue tant dans la sphère publique que dans la sphère privée. Elle est perçue comme un phénomène inexistant dans la mesure où les actes de cette violence font partie de la vie de tous les jours des citoyens. La domination masculine est tellement ancrée dans nos inconscients que nous ne l'apercevons plus. Plus grave encore, la culture ambiante ne

condamne pas cette forme de violence. Ces actes sont rarement signalés mais lorsqu'ils y sont, ils sont rarement enregistrés auprès des autorités concernées. La violence symbolique a pour effet la soumission des femmes sans que les hommes aient besoin d'avoir recours à la force. La discrimination et le manque de protection en matière de violence s'inscrivent dans le cadre juridique du pays ainsi que dans les mœurs de la société.

Les salafistes et les wahabites ainsi que les autres groupes extrémistes rigoristes se sont octroyé un droit presque divin sur les populations, particulièrement sur les femmes et les jeunes filles. Ce droit leur permet de faire de toutes les femmes, sans exception, une propriété privée. Par conséquent ils se sont autorisés à exercer librement des violences sur celles qui ne pratiquent pas la sharia, perçue comme loi et non pas comme voie à suivre. De cet axiome, ils vont plus loin dans leurs récriminations pour dicter un comportement strict à suivre à la maison, dans la rue, sur le lieu de travail, y compris dans la vie intime.

### **Cas des actes de violences**

En juillet 2001, des femmes vivant seules à Hassai Messaoud, une cité pétrolière du Sahara, ont été la cible de raids punitifs d'une extrême violence. Plusieurs centaines d'hommes entendaient les châtier au motif qu'elles se livraient à la prostitution.

Depuis la mise en application de la loi sur la réconciliation nationale en 2005, l'Algérie vit au rythme de la régression rappelant étrangement le climat qui avait régné durant la décennie du terrorisme et de la violence politique. Il est facile de constater que l'idéologie islamique est devenue, dix ans après la promulgation de cette loi, plus tolérée par les pouvoirs publics qu'avant. L'idéologie islamique rampante a conquis plusieurs espaces. Les institutions étatiques sont devenues des « niches » des archaïsmes de tous genres. Encouragés par la déliquescence de l'Etat-nation, des groupes extrémistes se sont rapidement emparés des médias. L'ouverture débridée des médias leur a permis de faire main basse rapidement sur les chaînes TV privées, au nombre d'une trentaine alors que cinq seulement remplissent les cahiers de charge. Ces groupes sont les grands gagnants de l'ouverture médiatique. Ils occupent les plateaux des chaînes de télévision privées et les colonnes des journaux qui leur sont affiliés, pour diffuser des messages rétrogrades, misogynes et, souvent,



faisant l'apologie du charlatanisme. La femme est au centre de leur discours. Elle est souvent jugée, comme étant la responsable de tous les maux de la société. Elle est responsable, par exemple, du taux élevé du chômage, de la crise de logement, de la délinquance juvénile, du faible taux de fécondité... Toutes les données chiffrées contredisent pourtant ces allégations. Les filles sont plus nombreuses que les garçons à l'université dans les pays arabes. En Algérie, par exemple, elles représentent 65% des effectifs. Malgré cela, elles ne représentent que 17% de l'emploi.

Les femmes qui ne portent pas le hidjab sont la cible préférée de ces groupes islamiques. Les vêtements non islamiques sont perçus comme « indécents ». Le hidjab ou le nigab est imposé même à l'intérieur des foyers. Récemment, un agent de sécurité a empêché une étudiante de rentrer à l'université pour passer ses examens. Selon cet agent, « sa jupe est trop courte pour entrer dans l'enceinte de l'université ». Il n'a pas été évidemment sanctionné pour une cette forme de violence dans une université qui a plus d'un siècle d'existence et qui a formé de grands leaders du mouvement national arabe.

Comme autre cas significatif, notons, l'excès en matière prosélytisme de part de certaines ONG. Dans un village à Azeffoun, en Grande Kabylie, Amela appelé les jeunes filles scolarisées, à se débarrasser de l'habit traditionnel kabyle (robe et foulard berbères) pour porter le hidjab. Selon ces missionnaires, la robe berbère aux couleurs trop chatoyantes ferait dans la provocation sexuelle. Les prêcheurs dans ce village paisible, comme ailleurs à travers le territoire national, ne respectent pas l'usage des hauts parleurs qui est régi pourtant par le décret relatif à la pollution sonore de juillet 1995. Le citoyen lambda a des difficultés à comprendre pourquoi il est mal vu quand il soulève cette question en public. Les plus zélés salafistes appellent tout simplement à la fermeture des dernières églises qui existent encore. Plus problématique encore, ils tentent de bannir les traditions de solidarité locale, telles que « Twiza », ou « Lawziya ». A Blida, une ville située à 30 Km d'Alger, en 2013, l'association, Al dawaa a mené une campagne de sensibilisation pour convaincre les fillettes 10 à 15 de porter le hidjab. Auparavant, en 2008, son secrétaire général était targué avoir convaincu 300 jeunes filles du bien-fondé du hidjab. Durant le Ramadhan 2014, le Centre culturel de Béjaïa a organisé le Festival du rire. Les salafistes ont exigé l'annulation du

spectacle. Motif invoqué, le rire entre homme et femme est source de « débauche ». A Oran, les salafistes ont publié des communiqués condamnant entre autres l'émission télévisuelle, Star Academy. Cette émission célèbre dans le monde est de promouvoir de jeunes artistes. Elle est décriée comme une astuce de « diffusion de la fornication et la pornographie en terre d'islam ». A la veille de la journée de la femme, 2015, un imam dans une mosquée à Alger déclare que « la femme doit accepter les coups qui lui sont assésés par son mari ». Rassurant les maris, il ajoute « les coups que les femmes subissent les rapprochent davantage du paradis ».

La violence envers les femmes prend diverses formes et se manifeste tant au sein de la famille que dans des institutions. Fin 2014, les services de la police ont constaté que les problèmes familiaux venaient en tête de liste des actes de violence contre les femmes avec 4113 cas pour les neuf premiers mois, soit 58%. Une enquête du ministère délégué chargé de la famille et de la condition féminine réalisée sur l'année 2007 indique que 8277 femmes ont été violentées soit 23 victimes/jour. Elles étaient 15.000 en 2006 selon les statistiques de la police. Dans ce nombre on relève 531 de sévices corporels, 2511 cas de maltraitance, 174 harcèlements sexuels contre 158 en 2006. Selon un bilan de la gendarmerie, 6.039 femmes ont subi des violences en 2012 à travers le territoire national. Les violences ont touché 3.726 femmes sans travail, 2.681 femmes mariées et 2.500 femmes célibataires. Entre 100 et 200 femmes meurent chaque année de violences familiales.

### **La loi contre la violence**

Le code pénal punit certes le viol de cinq à dix ans de réclusion dans son article 336. Cependant, aucune définition du viol n'est disponible dans ce document. Cet article est inséré dans la section « attentat aux mœurs », mais la nature de cet acte n'est pas très explicite et clairement définie. Aucune forme aucune de violence sexuelle ne l'est également définie dans cet article.

Après plusieurs années de mobilisation des femmes, les députés algériens ont finalement adopté, en mars 2015, une loi criminalisant les violences contre les femmes. L'amendement au code pénal prévoit des peines de prison pour quiconque qui porte volontairement des coups à des femmes. Désormais « quiconque porte volontairement des coups à son conjoint risque de 1 à 20 ans de prison avec la

réclusion à perpétuité en cas de décès». Le texte prévoit également des peines de six mois à deux ans de prison pour « quiconque exerce sur son épouse des contraintes afin de disposer de ses biens et de ses ressources financières ». La loi énonce également le harcèlement de rue, ce qui est une nouveauté, mais aussi de harcèlement verbal et psychologique au sein du couple. En bref, comme telle, cette loi est une avancée dans le processus de libération de la femme.

### **Les réactions des députés**

Ce projet de loi a toutefois provoqué la colère des élus conservateurs. Ces derniers y voient tout simplement « une dislocation de la famille » et une « imposition des normes occidentales ». Au sein de l'Assemblée nationale qui ne compte pourtant pas des salafistes en tant que tels, les députés des groupes « islamistes modérés » ont accusé le gouvernement de vouloir imposer des normes occidentales à une société musulmane. Le texte est « contraire aux préceptes coraniques et vise la dislocation de la famille », a estimé un député de l'Alliance pour l'Algérie Verte, une coalition de partis islamistes. Les députés d'une autre formation islamiste, El Adala, ont réclamé des lois mettant fin « au non-port du voile et à la nudité des femmes dans les lieux publics, cause principale des harcèlements ». Selon un autre député de la même coalition il n'y aurait nul besoin d'avoir recours à la loi pour résoudre le problème de harcèlement sexuel et de violences envers les femmes. A cette fin, il suffirait simplement que les Algériennes fassent preuve de « pudeur ». Selon lui, « les femmes sont responsables des violences qu'elles subissent en raison de leur accoutrement et de leur maquillage ». Un député indépendant a tout simplement estimé que cette loi constitue une légitimation des relations extraconjugales. Selon lui, « il serait plus simple d'avoir une maîtresse ». Un autre a déclaré, « les femmes sont responsables des violences qu'elles subissent en raison de leurs tenues vestimentaires ». Un autre est allé encore très loin, « *On ne peut criminaliser un homme qui a été excité par une femme.* »

La loi qui a secoué les députés de leur torpeur, a des limites dans son application. Elle introduit la notion de pardon. Quand l'épouse pardonne à son mari, la loi met fin aux poursuites judiciaires. La femme peut subir facilement dans un environnement donné des pressions familiales pour pardonner à son mari. Sous le prétexte fallacieux, elle ne doit pas étaler le « linge sale » en dehors de la

famille. La clause sur le pardon pose un sérieux problème, car c'est une mise en échec de la parole des femmes et un message d'impunité aux auteurs des violences. En dépit de cette réaction épidermique, le gouvernement a réussi à imposer ce projet de loi aux députés.

### **Le Conseil de la nation**

Plus de dix mois après son vote au parlement, cette loi n'a toujours pas été validée par le Conseil de la nation. Entre temps, les salafistes se sont mobilisés pour que le Sénat bloque cette loi qui introduirait d'une façon irréversible le pays dans la modernité politique. Le président du Conseil de la Nation n'a pourtant aucune prérogative juridique pour bloquer un projet voté par le parlement. Il est tenu par une procédure législative strictement déterminée par la Constitution, la loi organique du 08/03/1999 et les règlements intérieurs des deux Chambres du Parlement. Par conséquent, si un texte est bloqué, il ne peut l'être finalement qu'avec l'accord du gouvernement.

En 2016, l'Algérie doit présenter à Genève son rapport à la Convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination. Les femmes sont déjà mobilisées à cette fin. Un collectif d'une dizaine d'associations de femmes a déjà adressé, le 29 juin 2015, une lettre au président du Sénat, pour dénoncer le silence du gouvernement. Quant aux groupes conservateurs sous la houlette du *Front de la Sahwa islamique salafiste*, un parti non agréé, ils se sont mobilisés dans les médias ainsi que dans les mosquées. L'enjeu de cette loi est aujourd'hui d'une grande importance politique pour le succès de la transition démocratique et pour la construction d'une société ouverte. Rappelons que le gouvernement a réussi à faire passer depuis le Printemps arabe plusieurs lois liberticides dans plusieurs domaines (Communications, journalisme, ONG, partis politiques, justice) dont leur objectif ultime est le verrouillage systématique des espaces de libertés et de la société civile au profit de la société islamisée selon des principes donnés.

On vit dans un environnement international dans lequel nos sociétés connaissent de profondes mutations bouleversant les relations patriarcales et les anciens équilibres d'autorité. Les valeurs ancestrales et traditionnelles au lieu de servir de socle et de racines pour mieux affronter les nouveaux défis, elles sont instrumentalisées par le pouvoir politique et les groupes islamiques, notamment les salafistes et autres.

Les violences sous toutes ses formes contre les femmes et les jeunes filles représentent un fléau qu'il faut combattre énergiquement tous les moyens. Ce fléau est la source de nos difficultés pour vivre ensemble dans une société de bien-être et de progrès social.

## **CONCEPTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION**

*Souryana YASSINE*

### **Introduction**

Symbolic violence is undoubtedly one of the dominant forms of Gender-based violence that prevail in institutions which are supposedly gender-fair contexts such as universities. Not always easy to diagnose, because based on subtle processes of social positioning, symbolic violence remains nonetheless very harmful with psychological effects on women. At times, it is not even possible for these women to name such violence knowing that dominant (legitimate) discourses do not leave space for verbal representations of harmful and discriminating practices. Therefore this study attempts to shed light on the ways women at Higher education do perceive symbolic violence and their main conceptions of the phenomenon.

Higher Education women's answers to interview questions together with their narratives constitute valuable resources which unveil the various manifestations of symbolic violence both the levels of discourse and behaviour. Linguistic practices, for example, highlight the different verbal strategies used to exercise symbolic violence over women. Discriminating behaviour, as it is concerned, is identified through the attitudes displayed and awkwardness which characterises it.

### **Symbolic Violence**

Violence is a complex and harmful phenomenon which exists in all societies and cultures. It "... includes any act of verbal or physical force, coercion or life threatening deprivation, directed at an individual... that causes physical or psychological harm, humiliation or arbitrary deprivation of liberty and that perpetuates... subordination" (Heise et al., 2002:6). Violence is therefore exercised by a dominant social group/ individual over a dominated subordinate social group/ individual. It targets the most vulnerable and manifests itself in numerous ways, hence the different types of violence such as physical, psychological, social and symbolic violence. This latter is so subtle that it is overlooked in many contexts.

Conceptualised by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, symbolic violence appears as a “gentle, invisible violence, unrecognised as such” (Bourdieu, 1990). It exists in all social contexts and includes all “... those inconspicuous forms of violence, domination, and exclusion in everyday affairs that go unnoticed precisely because they are so ordinary and “unremarkable”” (Topper, 2001). It is part of the social practices which construct interpersonal relations in many contexts through verbal and non-verbal interactions. Symbolic violence consists of “the silent modes, almost unconscious, of cultural/social domination occurring in the daily social habits, maintained over the conscious subjects in order to reveal the dynamics of power relations in social life” (Nicolaescu, 2010). It structures and reproduces the mechanisms of domination against a given group and is often a powerful part of a wider gender-based violence.

Gender-based violence is, in many contexts, used as synonymous with Violence against Women (VAW). It occurs in all societies and at different stages of a woman’s life (Terry and Horne 2007). Therefore a “ ... rights-based approach to GBV needs to be culturally negotiated at local levels” (ibid) if any concrete changes are sought knowing that the United Nations has identified gender-based violence as a global health and development issue (Felipe and Pirlott 2006).

### **Gender in Higher Education**

Gender is a social construction. It “is not formed only during the early years of our lives, Instead, in our interactions throughout our lives, we subtly (and sometimes not so subtly) let others know what we expect from them as gendered beings” (Ropers-Huilman, 2003). All social interactions involve the notion of gender in a way or another to position participants and assign them specific identities.

In this respect, Higher Education is not an exception. Therefore, “... although the concept of egalitarianism pervades higher education, somehow that concept does not translate into equal opportunities and experiences for women and men...” (Brooks, 1997) Even in such contexts, social actors are looked at as gendered individuals who are expected to act and react in a pre-established appropriate way following gender divisions which prevail in the society. Indeed, research suggests that administrators, teachers, and students are all involved in the construction of gender in Higher Education.

## **Context of the Study and Methodology**

The study consists of a field investigation. It is based on an interview (see appendix) and a collection of narratives of women academics. The interview questions were initially written in English, but as many of the respondents were not very fluent in this language the questions have been translated to French.

The study was conducted at the Faculty of Letters and Languages at Mouloud Mammeri University, Algeria. It took place during April – May 2015. The faculty of letters and Languages is one of the nine faculties which constitute the University of Tizi Ouzou. It includes four language departments: Department of Arabic Language and Letters, Department of Tamazight Language and Culture, Department of French, and Department of English. The choice of the faculty of letters is motivated by the fact that participants have background in language studies and discourse.

Women academics (Senior lecturers, lecturers, administrators, and trade unionists) from the different departments were approached and asked to take part in the study. Eight (08) of them were willing to participate. They have different positions and a professional experience at the university which ranges from 10 to 25 years. They kindly accepted to answer the interview questions and to provide their narratives of specific cases of symbolic violence.

The participants were very cooperative and even glad to be offered an opportunity to report their experiences of symbolic violence at the level of Higher Education. Their interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. They took place in the participants' offices for the administrators and in the staffrooms of the faculty for the lecturers. The interviewees were given the choice to be recorded though they preferred the interviewer to note down their answers giving her enough time to write down every answer. To guarantee anonymity the interviewees were offered the possibility to choose a pseudo. But some of them preferred to use their initial and rejected the idea of a pseudo considering it as kind of violence in itself. They explained that it was important for them to keep their identities.

The collected answers and narratives were analysed according to critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1996) and classified into different categories. They revealed outstanding and insightful results



showing the conceptions and the perceptions of women academics of symbolic violence which they notice both at the level of the language and at the level of behaviour.

### **Linguistic Symbolic Violence at Higher Education**

The analysis of the collected data revealed that the participants perceive symbolic violence in the discourses that prevail at the university. They affirm that it is exercised by most of administrators, fellow lecturers and students. Both males and females do reproduce the social practices of symbolic violence which prevails in the society at large.

This violence is noticed mainly through a number of linguistic practices such as:

#### ***Derogatory Vocabulary***

Some derogatory vocabulary items were quite often used to refer to women at Higher Education. The discriminating lexis used is mainly in the local languages such as Kabyle and Algerian Arabic.

e.g. 1: "***Tiqcicin***" (which means little girls in Kabyle) was the term often used by many male lecturers when referring to their female colleagues with whom they share same teaching units.

e.g. 2: "***Tabargazt***" (Which means a woman with manly manners in Kabyle and which quite insulting) was used to qualify a woman trade unionist by her colleagues in order to signify that her actions are not 'feminine' and that she ought to be softer in her positions.

Using such vocabulary in the local languages reinforces the

***Jokes and Humour:*** Making jokes about the physical appearance of women academics is another feature of the linguistic symbolic violence the participants in the study pointed at. It reduces women academics to their physical appearance which should conform to a pre-established socially accepted image. This image is sometimes related to material ease and at others to prudery rules.

e.g. 3 : « ***On ne dirait pas que tu travailles à l'université !*** »  
("It doesn't look as if you work at the university »)

e.g. 4 : « ***Tu as pris beaucoup de poids !*** »  
(*You put on weight: God bless anyway!*)

## **Complementing**

Complements are also used in a malicious way. Though they are part of positive politeness, they are used to mock the achievements of women academics when they access responsibility positions either at the faculty or within the teachers' trade union. The respondents reported that the intonations with which such complements were uttered by their male colleagues did not leave any space to doubt the aggressive attitude they convey. The mixing of the foreign language and the local language is meant to reinforce the negative evaluative stance of the complements.

e.g. 5 : « Vous êtes belle, le poste vous a changé ! »

(You look beautiful, the [new] position has transformed you! »

(You are active, that's good)

## **Irony**

Irony is another example of linguistic strategies the participants identified as a means of exercising symbolic violence over them. Saying something and meaning its opposite or another thing is reported by most of the interviewees who detect the implied meaning with great dexterity. They feel as mocked at and explain that irony is one of the worst verbal practices which offend them the way direct insults would do.

e.g. 6: (We ought to buy you a new coat, a coat which fits your position as a university lecturer !)

e.g. 7: (You probably forgot to stop by the hairdresser!)

## **Proverbs and Other Cultural Sayings/Expression**

Some cultural sayings which compare women and men and give a negative image of women are the other linguistic practice which embodies symbolic violence. In many societies in North Africa proverbs plays an essential role in the cultural transmission which allows for the socialisation of the individuals. They are taken as common knowledge and not so often questioned. Consequently, they have a considerable symbolic power. Many women academics felt violated when subject to description by a proverb because they are reduced to stereotyped images of how they should be.

e.g. 8: (You are worth a 100 men since you joined the trade union)

e.g. 9: (You look manly)

## **Behaviour Reflecting Symbolic Violence**

In addition to the linguistic practices, the participants identified also a number of behaviours which they really consider as instances of symbolic violence and which they condemn explicitly. Such behaviour consists of:

### ***Patronising Attitudes and Condescendence***

Male colleagues making reference to motherhood duties and deciding about priorities for women. They elect themselves as spokes persons for women academics trying to make them feel guilty when asking of equity. Therefore, some participants report the attitude of a male administrator who finds it unacceptable that a woman asks for a study leave to do research in foreign universities for a whole month while she should be taking care of her kids. He is not embarrassed to tell female academics how they should set their priorities in life!

e.g. 10 : A head of department: "Pour les enseignantes qui sont mères on ne peut pas donner un mois de stage ! »

(For female lecturers who are mothers we cannot offer one month training! Meaning it should be shorter than that!)

### **Arbitrary Exclusion from Decision Making**

Excluding women administrators from decision-making is another common practice that the respondents reported. They feel as their presence at those responsibility positions is just accessory. Women academics have equal right to be appointed as administrators at all levels of Higher Education in Algeria. But in practice, male colleagues and even some fellow women do not accept their authority. The participants' narratives highlight situations where they are arbitrarily excluded from decision making. They feel that their legitimacy is questioned.

e.g. 11: A deputy head of department is excluded: "They need to be asked by the "male" administrator considering his intervention as more legitimate!!!"

### ***Ignoring Academic Women's Presence and Expressed Opinions***

Another aspect of symbolic violence the participants perceived is the fact of being ignored by their male colleagues during meetings where important pedagogic and administrative decisions are taken.

In their narratives it comes clear that women academics are not treated equally. To make their presence noticed they need to resort to strategies such as repeating their opinions or raising their voices to be noticed. The traditional social practices which exclude women from decision-making is reproduced at the level of Higher Education. It is indeed one of the strongest manifestations of symbolic violence.

e. g. 12: And in meetings my opinion is simply 'ignored'. I need to voice it many times and sometimes 'louder' to make it heard while it really was the right thing to do from the beginning. I desperately repeat 'The work is done!!!'

### ***Using Religion to Justify Awkward Behaviour***

Another behaviour which translates the prevalence of symbolic violence at Higher Education consists in the fact that some male responsible do side with awkward behaviour by male students and use religion to justify their attitudes. The illustrating narrative report the case where a male student not wanting to sit next to a female student during the exam and how the male pedagogic responsible sides with him against the female lecturer reminding her she is a woman and consequently she ought understand. This example perfectly illustrates the reproduction of the social traditional patriarchy where women's position is relegated to the backdoors.

e.g. 13 : Quand un étudiant religieux (أخينا) s'éloigne ou refuse de s'asseoir à côté d'une fille et refuse de se mettre à l'avant dans la salle d'examen. Il sort se plaindre au prêt du responsable pédagogique à la scolarité et que se responsable me dit : « Madame, faut pas lui tenir tête car lui c'est un homme et toi tu es une femme ».

### ***Gaze Avoidance While Discussing Together***

At the moments of interaction which require mutual consideration, women academics are stunned by the behaviour of some male colleagues do not look them in the eyes. Gaze avoidance appears a strategy used to signify to women they are not equal partners. In face to face conversation gaze avoidance gives women academics the impression of not being taken seriously and not listened to. This is a lack of consideration as explicitly put in their narratives.

e. g. 14 : "Sometimes while interacting with me, men at the university (administrators, teachers and students) do not look at me, they just direct their gaze away, "It is really a lack of consideration!"

### ***Awkward Saluting and Hand Shaking Practices***

Social encounters which require mutual greetings of people are other instances of awkward behaviour women perceive as eloquent manifestations of symbolic violence. They report the case of saluting and hand shaking which is not neutral. Either it is meant as a possessive act to signify the socially admitted ownership of women by men or a definite rejection of femininity as sinful.

e. g. 15: "When it comes to saluting some men just resort to inappropriate hand shaking. "While some just keep you hand in theirs with force others only touch you by their fingers as if you are dirty. Both behaviours are awkward!"

Another significant fact, the symbolic violence is manifested most of the time during meetings (pedagogic and scientific in nature) which are normally professional settings where only academic qualifications are taken into consideration. But since they are spaces of interaction, the traditional patriarchal and socially accepted practices are brought to the front. Men do not accept a "competition" from women because it is socially "illegitimate".

### **Women's Reactions to Symbolic Violence**

Higher Education Women's reactions to symbolic violence are various but context-sensitive. All the participants explain that their reactions depend mainly on the situation and the relation they have with the person who exercises symbolic violence against them. On the whole, their reactions range from 'Silence' to 'Providing Explanations' to 'Voice Raising' and even 'Aggressive Attitudes' at times.

However, women academics have clear perceptions of all the linguistic and non-linguistic practices which reflect symbolic violence. They do detect such behaviour and are aware of its consequences. They feel a need to rebel and ask to be considered as fellow academics treated with equity.

E.g.16: *"Well, most of the time I keep silent because I know that, at the end; my colleagues will discover that I was right!!! At other times, I do my best to explain...keeping my nerves. Rarely, I raise my voice...it happens!"*

E.g. 17: *"Donc moi je ne laisse pas passer ! Je répons du tac au tac. Je n'encaisse pas ! Non je ne me tais pas, je ne laisse jamais passer une remarque."*

## Conclusion

The study shows that symbolic violence against women is a common practice in Higher Education departments exercised mainly by male colleagues and some fellow women academics. It is manifested through different mechanisms mainly at the levels of the language and behaviour. Discriminating discourses, using local native languages derogatory lexis, complementing, making jokes and resorting to irony, and evoking negative proverbs about women's social positioning are the main linguistic practices which embody the symbolic violence. At the level of the behaviour other practices such as patronising, condescendence, gaze avoidance, overlooking women's expressed opinions and their physical presence at meeting are the most frequent ones. These practices are sometimes justified by religious views which legitimate treating women academics as subordinates even at Higher Education where only scientific academic achievement should be taken into consideration. The participant women in the study are, in fact, aware of such symbolic violence and do perceive it whatever the forms it manifests through. This is explicit in their narratives which show that they do not accept it. Academic women's reactions to symbolic violence are contextual varying from a situation to another. However, these reactions need to be more systematic to have impact on the inappropriate verbal and non-verbal behaviour which perpetuates symbolic violence in a context that ought to be gender-fair.

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## **WHERE DOES THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN LEAD ?**

*Kahina BOUAGACHE*

When women took/take part in various revolutions, and lately the so-called Arab Spring, we would never have imagined finding ourselves in such state of degradation few years later.

Violence against women in the region is almost daily and in each of the Arab countries, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Algeria ... , whether as a war consequence, family violence, discrimination, or because of the silence of the society and the world!

Today we are not just endangered in our private sphere but also in the public sphere, the laws are becoming increasingly rare and when they try to be born, they are faced with refractory speech, from radical clerics, conservative parties that try to have their misogynous and discriminating discourses put forward.

Any case study tackling raise of this violence in any country of the region and its repercussion or outcomes, will be similar to another neighboring country, because and despite the how different the countries of the region can be, they are all aligned when it comes to women's right and the diminution of women's image within their societies.

### **Law development Vs opposition**

In the post the Arab Spring, Algeria, wanted to advocate the "WOMAN empowerment" discourse. In this regards, it did amend its elections code by imposing a 30 percent quota. Today, Algeria serves as a model in the Arab world with its 31 percent representation of women in the parliamentary institution; this puts Algeria at the head of all Arab States.

However and despite this beautiful picture and encouraging figures, women's position within this society remain the same if not worsened in some cases. The rise of fundamentalism and radical discourse in the country, where daily voices raise to banish women and put them back in their "original" position as wife/mother/sister men servant are beyond words. Accordingly the violence against women is growing considerably.



## Data On Violence

Years	Source	Data
2014	Source DGSN: <b>Direction Générale de la Sureté Nationale</b>	<b>Victims:</b> 40 women were murdered, 23 have escaped death 6886 others were physically assaulted
		<b>The offenders:</b> Husbands in 7737 cases Family members in 3209 cases, and Strangers in 15,707 cases.
2014	<b>Department of Justice</b>	40 homicide cases enrolled in the courts, where 37 trial. 23 attempted murder cases against women, including 21 considered. 6886 intentional assault, including 634 trial
		<b>The profiles of the victims:</b> 751 divorcees, 440 widows 3847 married

Considering the growing number of women and violence, the women MP's with the proposal from the Department of Justice, proposed a new law to fight "Violence against women" in both private and public spheres. This new proposal aims to amend the Algerian penal code.

### **Proposed Articles:**

**Article 266 bis & bis 1** : assault and aggression on the partner

**Art. 330** : - Family abandonment by a parent for more than two months

- The husband that leaves wife (\*\*without real motif)

**Art. 330 bis** : - intimidation to control wife's good (\*\*forgiveness end law suit)

**Art. 333 bis 1** : harassment or molestation in public places (\*\*the sentence is twice if the victim is under 16 yo)

**Art. 368** : possibility of annulment of punishable penalties between ascendants and descendants.

**Art. 369** : rape between spouses/relatives/collaterals. Law suits conditioned by a complaint (\*\* forgiveness ends the prosecution)

These basic texts, which include the possibility to put an end to the prosecution in case of withdrawal of the law suits by the victims, was furiously welcomed by the conservatives political parties<sup>1</sup>, as well as some other MP's, virulently attacking the bill as a way to "undermine and destroy the family", as if the violence strengthen family tights.

The MOJ presentation for the project was subject to over 140 oral insulting questions by adopting radical/conservative speech. In order to stop a project that intends to end violence!

These are some instances from sentences collected from MP's:

1. **Talking about the wives subject to violence:** "if women are assaulted in the street, it's their fault. And if one of them is beaten by her husband and files a complaint against him, it will explode the family."
2. **Talking about sexual harassment in the streets:** a) "You cannot criminalize a man who was excited by a woman." OR, b) another notes that women with "their non-Sharia-compliant clothes are responsible for the violence of men."
3. **Overall discussion about the proposed law:** A member of the same movement evokes the risk of supremacy of women over men.

Despite all this radical and misogynist discourse, the bill was finally adopted by the first chamber (i.e. parliament) but remains blocked at the second chamber "senate", since March 2015. NGO's are expecting some push from the President, are still waiting to see the end of the tunnel and the final amendment of the law.

This experience does show us the outcome of this society, and what is really threatening the Muslim societies in the MENA region, which is the rise of extremist discourses, the degradation of the image of the woman, through the degradation of the image of the mother, daughter, sister and the wife; we can notice today that there is no difference between the speeches of Islamo-conservatives (who are left to talk/preach freely), the Islamic State but also the silence of the governments in place!

### ***Where will the Rise in Violence against Women Lead Us?***

The equation is very simple, undermining of half of the population, leads to the raise of violence against women, which leads to raising violence within these/any society, and more the maturity of youth to accept and follow the radical group discourse.

Today, considering the growth of Extremist Groups, the region's main challenge should be to focus on cutting the edge for radicalization, and make sure that our youth targeted by Islamist groups have solid grounds that allow them to stand against those recruiters.

Algeria's role in the fight against international terrorism and assistance from the EU and individual member states in its counterinsurgency efforts especially France, Spain and Italy is very important, and post Secretary Kerry to Algiers, the think tank Carnegie Endowment underlines that "Algeria has been deeply involved in Africa's security architecture for years.", with actions made in Sahel countries (Mali, Niger and Mauritania), and with Tunisia.

Today, any regional cooperation is indeed a key in the preservation of peace and security in the region. Amid these conflicts of all sorts, one element that should be highlighted and should remain common to the people of the region is the growing extremist sentiment in the people/citizen of each country.

The Arab countries prefer to remain silent and leave unnoticed the growing extremist sentiment, believing that standing against this sentiment, would equal standing against Islam as a religion, which is totally false sentiment, when I believe, that standing against extremists will rather allow Islam to rehabilitate itself as a religion of peace rather than hate, killing and violence as it is seen from the majority of the world, according to the different operations led under Islam's name.

Beyond the diplomatic, military and political regional and international cooperation to fight terrorism, the region must stand for universal principals, each country should guarantee these principals to its citizens; the freedom of religion, thoughts, beliefs, while today some countries of the region do believe that "**being secular is a crime, and you can be condemned for apostasy**".

Isn't it the same discourse put forward by ISIS when killing their victims, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi accepted the oath of the Darnah-based Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC), urging Libyans (along with Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans) to "fight the secularists."?

I believe that many reforms should be undertaken by Algerians' and beyond or side by side with the Military reforms and activities to fight against terror, the country should urgently focus on:

- Reforms its education; enabling young generation to be born and to grow in an environment based on equality, fundamental civil rights, universal rights, where they can be fed that the promotion should be based on meritocracy rather than sex (female/male);

- States should abolish all forms of Discrimination against Women and girls, by starting with the abolition of their repressing “Family Code” imposed on women and reduce their most fundamental rights,
- Preserve the achieved rights and fight for the promotion of women’s rights at all levels!
- A regional cooperation initiative by creating a Forum of Civil Society, are needed to challenge and grow to a higher level and find a way to develop in a more associative approach, and gather all the major players.
- The region should look into building a counterterrorism strategy, where partnership and collaboration should focus on promoting women’s rights by developing their rights and development, and this is not just on a traditional vision, but by promoting women’s rights you promote the image of over 50% of the society, and you value them, and make sure you mature your societies enough to accept them as part of the society and not only as a way to reach paradise or a body to rape. And this is also applicable to the youth, who consist 70% of the population, and therefore should be an inclusive part of the decision making process.

We have the role and obligation to shape/reshape the youth, feed their spirits on rights and equality rather than hatred and violence that serve the interests of extremist groups in the region, and help them easily recruit.

It is only by ending internal radicalization discourses that we can stop the growing and the extension of radical groups and can cut edge to extremist groups and stop nourishing them. Also, it is only when we reach this level of maturity in the debate and advancement, of citizen’s rights and women’s rights that we can fight these extremist groups from their very deep roots, and cut the edge for any possible advancement or growth for these terrorist groups, by ending the recruitment.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> L’Alliance de l’Algérie verte islamo-conservateurs, TAJ, FLN Indépendants.



## **RECRUITMENT OF NORTH AFRICAN GIRLS AND WOMEN TO JIHAD**

*Moha ENNAJI*

### **Introduction**

Much is known about Muslim men leaving their countries to partake in jihad on behalf of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) or Daesh, as it is referred to in the MENA region. Yet, less has been written about women flocking to Syria to join the jihad. Experts view them as a growing terrorist menace.

We need a better understanding of what drives women to take part in, and even give their lives for, violent groups that insist on their inferiority. We cannot counter radical narratives if we do not understand the motives of the radicalized.

For the last several months, Daesh has launched a new online marketing campaign aiming to lure girls and women from North Africa and the West to fight on its behalf. In April 2014, it began recruiting single women between the ages of 16 and 25 for all-female brigades (Cockburn 2015).

There have been several reports of European women traveling to Syria to join up with jihadists there. Recently, an all-woman jihadist group calling itself Al Zawraa announced its establishment on the Internet, saying that it sought to prepare women for jihad by teaching them Shariaah (Islamic law), weapons use, social media and other online tools, first aid, sewing and cooking for male fighters.

The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated that in 2014 there were 5,000 women fighting in Syria. However, the recruitment of women is unusual for the country's Islamist groups, perhaps because their leaders see fighting jihad as incompatible with religious prescriptions.

The precise number of girls and women seeking to join the terror groups is actually unclear, but some analysts estimate that roughly 10 percent of recruits from the West are women, often influenced by social media networks that offer advice, tips, and even logistical support for travel. Additionally, there are plenty of online marriage markets for young Salafists.

There are plenty of online marriage markets for young Salafists, including contact sites like ask.fm. One entry there reads, for example: "Courageous lion, steadfast and unwavering, is looking ..."

Until recently, a blog for women called "My Life in Syria" posted videos along with harmless diary entries about doing laundry, shopping and cooking. "I have a longing for the mountains, the rocks and the sites of jihad," the blogger wrote in one entry. The site has since been deleted.

### **The role of women jihadists in Syria and Iraq**

Recruited women perform searches on women at checkpoints in and around the city of Raqqa, controlled by the Islamic State. They wave firearms and enforce the jihadist code of conduct - and they do it all while fully veiled, because the brigade is entirely female.

The appearance of these female brigades, coupled with the increasing inflow of foreign female jihadists into Syria, is a sign of how women's role may be changing in a context where militant groups have established themselves as de facto governments.

Life conditions inside the radical groups are often different from the cheerful images on screens. Daesh is led by men and is rigorously male dominated with recruits separated by gender. Female recruits often find the reality is far different from that ideal.

Because, according to radical Islamist groups, a woman has to be with a mahram (male guardian) when she moves, members of Daesh solve the male guardianship issue by encouraging women who wish to fight, particularly foreign fighters, to arrange a marriage with a fellow fighter beforehand, so that they will have a guardian once they reach Syria. It seems contradictory that women fight in their ranks, considering the terror group's staunch adoption of laws that are unfavorable to women.

Daesh, for example, recently published guidelines detailing how females should appear in public, including having their hands and feet covered, and to always have a male guardian with them while walking on the streets. They have even required shopkeepers to cover their store mannequins with full-face veils. They have also banned women from leaving their homes, except if they are going to the hospital to give birth.

Terror groups are equally deploying women as law enforcers of their strict Islamic moral codes, a sign of how women's role may be changing in a context where militant groups have established themselves as de facto governments. The most well-known female moral police, called al-Khansaa Brigade, was created in the city of Raqqa in 2013 (Diehl et al. 2015).

Some jihadists envision women in a support role: cooking, nursing, and providing children with religious teaching. Others suggest that female jihadists could mother Syrian orphans. This also demonstrates how such structures are emerging to replace lost government services.

These pseudo-institutions are particularly important for jihadist groups, which aim not only to topple a regime, but also to establish an Islamic state across the Middle East and North Africa. Women will be an important part of this state-building exercise.

With the increase of the number of fatalities in the ranks of Islamic State following the coalition air-attacks, a dire need has risen to train a new generation that espouses the ideology and teachings of al-Qaeda, in order for the organization to survive.

### **The rising number of North African female jihadists**

There is a number of women from Tunisia and Morocco taking their chances and going off there, and it's likely that this trend grows over time as this network on social media increases.

In addition to deploying female recruiters that offer advice, tips and even logistical support for travel, jihadist terror groups are actively employing social media networks, including Twitter and chat rooms, to lure Westerners, including women, to the battlefields of Syria and IS.

Pro-jihad propaganda aimed at women is careful to avoid images of decapitated enemies, opting instead for mountains and flowers. It seeks to show how wonderful the role of women in Salafism can be. "It's all very bucolic," says one intelligence officer.

These networks often portray life under the caliphate as a kind of Islamic paradise that offers a religious alternative to what can often be a second-class life of struggle and alienation in the West.

In most cases, Tunisian and Moroccan young women who seek jihad do not come from particularly religious families but are students who



want to go to Syria to marry a devout Muslim or provide humanitarian aid. As a rule, young women are radicalized outside the home, due to peer group influence, a preacher in a mosque (masjid) or through religious schools (madradas).

During the last few months, Spanish authorities arrested 8 young girls aged between 14 and 19 after attempting to join terrorists fighting in Iraq and Syria. Most were Spanish citizens of Moroccan origin. The recruitment of a minor shows that the terror groups have no respect for its targets' age.

Moroccan security forces have led numerous momentous raids on jihadist recruitment cells these last two years, arresting more than 40 people. Governments in the region fear that battle-hardened Islamist fighters may return from Syria and other conflict zones under the influence of Daesh and al-Qaida-inspired groups, posing a threat of attacks.

Al Qaida-aligned militias have also recruited Tunisian women. Officials stated that at least 300 women some as young as 13 were lured to Syria for sex with numerous jihadi rebels as part of what they termed a jihad sex war.

Authorities, which enhanced border control, have stopped thousands of recruits from leaving the North African state. After the sexual liaisons they experience there in the name of sexual holy war, they come home pregnant.

Daesh has now become a serious concern for families whose daughters are being tricked into offering sex to terrorists under the pretext of "a holy act" (Mahmood 2015).

A Tunisian girl, with initials T.A., tells her story of being deceived to go to Syria under the name of Jihad al-Nikah (pleasure marriage) to marry the terrorists in a bid to help them better fight against the Syrian government forces.

She says that Salafist preachers offer Islam as a simple solution to all problems, essentially sending out the message that all that matters is being a "good Muslim woman." But once they arrive in the war zone, the girls are isolated from the events going on around them. "They don't even understand just how dangerous the situation they have placed themselves in really is" she says.

Former Mufti of Tunisia Sheikh Othman Battikh described the so-called "sexual Jihad" as a form of "prostitution." Some Sunni Muslim Salafists, however, consider sexual jihad a legitimate form of holy war (Hicket 2014).

The jihadi problem is fueled by low youth employment, corruption, lack of opportunities, identity crisis, and social injustice. Young girls are often revolting against a family in which they are misunderstood or a society in which they don't feel appreciated.

Appeals to women to raise their children as jihadists seem to attract women who suffer from insecurity for three main reasons. First, many of them consider jihad a structured setting, where they can join, doing something that they feel is important. Second, they like to integrate a group that is very influential. Third, they are attracted by the idea of motherhood and being part of women who are struggling together with the company of nice jihadi husbands. It is as if being subjugated by a patriarchy and losing civil rights were preferable to the anxiety of freedom.

Security officials in North Africa and Europe are seriously concerned about the number of young women joining the jihad in Syria and Iraq. Women are ideal for preparing attacks, security officials say, because of their largely unobserved preparatory work, says one intelligence officer. They are stopped and searched less often than men, which makes them more efficient planners and perfect terrorists.

## **Conclusion**

To combat terrorism and extremism which is spreading in the MENA region requires political will. Appropriate laws should be enacted as soon as possible and policies must be implemented to ensure border control, the closure of financing ports, propaganda platforms, anti-addiction, etc. Civil society has to be proactive in countering Daesh and its allies. Counter terrorism should emanate from the inside, in coordination with the outside world through sensitizing youth, reforming education and media, regional and international cooperation and coordination, and through awareness raising in families, schools, universities and civil society organizations.

Since the spread of terror is the goal of Daesh, which seeks to paralyze societies, we expect the media to play a positive role by

refusing to be a tool serving extremism and terrorism by dealing with it professionally and rationally, and not by broadcasting terrorism news automatically.

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## **POVERTY, INEQUALITIES AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE: A CASE STUDY OF SCHOOL DROP - OUT GIRLS IN THE REGION OF FEZ-BOULMANE**

*Souad SLAOUI*

### **Introduction**

As an academic and an activist, the issue of violence among young girls especially when those girls drop out of school seem to me most attractive, fruitful and a virgin area as these two subjects are two complicated problems that interact with each other on the one hand, and in which a number of socio-economic, cultural and psychological variables interact on the other hand. Being subjected to violence and gender discrimination because of their dropping out of school or as a consequence of their low socio-economic conditions and low educational level that make the situation of these young girls most likely to be vulnerable. All these factors make me interested in this topic.

In the present paper, I seek to find the correlations between these problematic issues in the region of Fez Boulmane: school drop out girls and gender based violence with an eye to find out the causes that stand at the root of these serious and dangerous problems. It is worth pointing out that this paper is a reflection of work in progress. It seeks to describe some of the issues and challenges in addressing violence against girls and offered useful strategies in overcoming these problems in the region under study.

### **Contextualizing the Gender Based Violence and Drop-out School**

Morocco said that violence against women remained one of the most significant forms of discrimination at the global level. Morocco had implemented political and judicial reform to combat violence and to fight obstacles for women to access justice or achieve their political, economic and socio-cultural fulfillment; initiatives had also been implemented to ensure national legislations' conformity with international norms.

As far as dropping out school phenomenon is concerned, this issue has become very important be it among the education circles or non-

education circles and this is for both the national and International circles because of the diverse international reports produced by the United Nations or others classifying Morocco in the lower ladder at the International level and even at the African or Arab ladder.

Moroccan government has devoted a big budget in order to improve the educational system in what is known as the Emergency plan, The issue of dropping out occupies an important space in this project. But the scientific question worth addressing as also suggested by Ahmed Cherrak (2011) in which he addressed this issue in the region of Ain Naqbi and Sehb El ouard (which I am also examining) and Moulay Yacob Immouzer and Boulame. The scientific question worth asking is to what extent can this emergency plan prove to be sufficient to reduce this phenomenon of dropping out of school while there are non-material factors underlining it and which can hamper the profitability of this emergency reform to the maximum.

This paper seeks to interrogate this issue of dropping out of school with the gender based violence in this region of Fez Boulmane and Meknes.

### **Drop out of school as a social problem interacts with gender based violence**

Despite the signature of the conventions against all the discriminations against women, Morocco still cannot enact the laws against those committing violence against women... . Get inspired by the notes I took from the conference this morning and Rebecca's article.

#### ***Methodology***

To achieve the purpose of this research, I have formulated three hypotheses on the basis of gender-based violence literature and the previous studies done on school drop-out in different contexts.

*Hypothesis 1:* The poor socio-economic conditions is what makes the girls more likely to be subjected to gender based violence (in both public and private spheres).

*Hypothesis 2:* Early marriage which is believed to be an escape from the gender- based violence is actually making them go through the same experience in the private sphere.

*Hypothesis 3:* Empowering women and their families socially and economically help reducing gender inequalities, and consequently, gender based violence.

*Research Questions:* The main research question addressed in this piece of research is concerned with the extent to which gender-based violence among school drop-out girls correlate with poverty and gender inequalities in both the private and public spheres.

*Justification for the Choice of the Sample:*

This study adopts a qualitative method of research based on in depth interviews with 16 young girls whose age of dropping out of school vary between 9 and 15 years. They are of two categories: 50 percent of them are single mothers, and the other 50 percent are married with 1 to 4 children. 25 percent of the first informants are currently living spending between 1 week to 6months with their kids in the Batha Multi-dimensional Centre in the city of Fez, while the other 25 percent of this category are living under the shelter of Btissama centre in Meknes, who equally come from different cities of Morocco and who are later on sent to the centre in Fez. 75 percent of these interviewees were subject to sexual violence after dropping out school and 25 percent were subjected to physical violence by their female and male teachers which was the cause of their school drop out. It is worth pointing out that 75% of those who are sexually harassed were victims of their so called fiancée, and the rape is usually committed in the fiancée's parents' houses. Added to the sexual and physical violence, the girls also pointed out to the verbal violence by their teacher which was stated to be the main cause of dropping out of school. However, only 12, 5% who confirmed that their dropping out of school was due to the teachers' continuous absence which makes the girls loose the motivation of pursuing their studies.

1. At o the group of interviewees they are all married young girls who have between 1 to 5 children. While the first group were interviewewd in the centre of Fez by me, the other interviews in Btissama centre were carried out by my second year Master student in cultural studies. As to other group of married girls, I met them in their own houses in Ain Naqbi region, one of the poorest and marginalized districts in the city of Fez. It is worth pointing out that one of the school drop out married girls who promised me to be interviewed excused herself till

the last moment on account that she has just been divorced and her family refuses to have someone know about her story. Thus the number of my interviewees was 16 in total. Testimonies from these young girls living at the centre were not afraid of mentioning their names/ revealing the different types of violence they have been subjected to (e.g., rape, sexual harassment ...) unlike the second category who refuse to admit any kind of violence they have been subjected to either in the public sphere (school street...) or in their private life with their husband., which reflects the idea of honor, and fear of destroying or losing their families if they voice this kind of violence that those married girls go through and this is why the majority of them refuse to answer the question whether they have been ever subjected to any form of violence outside their house once dropping out of school or in their private sphere. 12, 5 percent state that it was their own personal decision to stop their studies. 12,5 percent attribute the causes of dropping out to their family poor conditions, 12.5 percent state that it is the need of the mother to help her in housework and her sisters' and brothers' education, 25% refer to the verbal violence and 12,5 percent also refer to physical violence as the cause of their dropping out school. The interviews were done in Moroccan Arabic. It is worth pointing out that domestic violence does not seem to be avowed when marital relationship still holds. It is only when conflicts are accentuated that women leave the house and start talking to her family. But when the violence is practiced in the community and outside the wedlock, which in most cases those girls/ women resort to the association for help, those girls openly talk about their suffering and turmoil.

In addition to the personal question (age of dropping out of school, age of getting married if ever they have been married/ and for those who are not married they were asked about when and how they joined the centre, they were also asked about whether they have already been subject to violence and if so to whom they have talked (a member of the family, a friend, a centre/ association member. For those who are married they asked about the extent to which marriage has changed their lives. The last question focused on their points of view about whether the socio-economic empowerment of women and

their families can help reducing the gender based violence or whether they have any other alternative suggestion(s) to sort out this problem under investigation.

The approach adopted is embedded with the conceptual approach that believes in socio-economic and cultural empowerment as a way out of poverty and eliminating gender inequalities and gender discrimination among school drop out girls.

### **Analysis and Interpretation**

Those who are interviewed in the centre of listening and hosting in the Batha Multi-dimensional Centre in the city of Fez, and those in the Btissama Centre in Meknes choose to interview 10 girls (Is it sufficient given the constraints of time) who already drop out of school and got married in the region of Ain Naqbi, some of them may still be married while others are already with or without children.

### ***Gender -Based Violence and Patriarchy***

Despite Morocco's signature to the conventions against all discrimination against women and girls, the application of these laws as stated in Sadiqi in an interview by Priscilla Maingre in the newspaper *le Matin*, on May 27, 2015 the application of these laws are usually confronted by the resistance which are of cultural orders. There are a lot of advancement as far as the laws are concerned, but a lot of things need be done, Sadiqi confirms. The strong influence of the patriarchal system in Moroccan culture and society encourages these traditional dynamic of relations between the sexes which is characterized by gender inequalities. Thus, social changes in women's roles has not been accompanied by a change in traditionally patriarchal attitudes and mentalities and thus the stereotyped view of men's and women's social roles has been perpetuated. For example, this research suggests that when rape occurs, or any other kind of violence occurs it's all the time girls who are blamed either because she is dressed in such a way, Women are always victimized while in reality it is always men who are behind such acts.

More importantly, it is worth pointing out the case of Khadija, from the region of Agouray, in the surroundings of the city of Meknes, she was 15 year old when she dropped out of school and now she is 18 years old, a single mother of a two month girl called rihab. Khadija mentioned



that the cause of her dropping out of school is her physical education teacher who asked the boys to go play football and stay with the girls in another he was drunk and she and other girls were subjected to sexual harassment by that teacher, When all the girls went to complain to the director, the whole administration asked them not to avow what happened to anyone and asked them to forget about what happened especially nothing serious happened. They worried about the teacher's losing his work, and they justify that by the fact that the teacher was not conscious of his deeds." Most importantly, this same girl after dropping out of school, she was raped by her fiancée to whom she was married just by Lfatiha. She was asked by her fiancée to go with him to mother's house to help his mother. When she went with him no one was at home, and he raped her. She was rejected by her family and they tortured her and finally found herself a maid. She knew about the name of the centre Ibtissana in Meknes from the TV program " TaHqia " and she went there where is living for about two months. Khadija added that when she brought her problem to the court, the justice was not on her side because she has had no hard evidence or this marriage, and the justice identified this act as being illegal.

Another case of Samira from Dkhissa one the surrounding areas in Meknes who left school at 11 year old whose answer to my question about whether she has been subjected to any violence in her life? She responded every girl has on one way or another confronted a case of violence in a way or another, it is part of our lives. I have been subjected to verbal and physical violence by my primary school teacher who used to beat us without any reason to the extent that I found no will or volition to study. He used to underestimate girls and repeated saying: your place is at home and not here."

Thus, it can be observed that the inequality of power imbalances between women and men are among the root causes of violence against women, underpinned by the persistence of patriarchal attitudes towards women. This of course is also affecting girls' education as most girls decide to drop out because of these gender inequalities and violent acts exerted on them, be verbally, physically or sexually either at school or outside.

The influence of poverty on school drop out girls' life and its effects on Gender based-violence in both private and public spheres. In addition,

it is remarkable that there is a correlation between poverty, school drop-out and gender-based violence. It seems that this poverty makes girls suffer from many hardships that deprive them from their human rights such education. Samira, the same girl who left school because of her teacher's violent acts towards her and her classmates noted that because of the very poor economic conditions of her family, her mother welcomed the idea of dropping out of school especially that this will enable Samira to help the mother in housework and this will allow the father to cover the fees of the other three male children to pursue their studies. The boys also work in summer in order to afford books and necessary requirements to study. So after one year and a half, Samira's father decided to marry her to his friend's son ( which means Samira married at the age of 12 and half ). This act of marriage has changed her life to the worst. The mother in law and the brothers in law used to harshly beat me, my husband was drug addicted. I have undergone all sort of sufferings, physical, economic and social hardships. When I gave birth to my fifth child neither my family nor my husband's family accepted me> I received help from a neighbor who put me in contact with listening centers in Meknes, Ibtissama where I am living now.

It can be noted that these school drop out girls live a vicious cycle. They wanted to escape violence in the public sphere, schools, but come back to find themselves undergoing the same violence acts at home with their husbands, and family laws as Samira declared.

I think that poverty reduction is more effective and sustainable when combined with investment in areas such as education. An educated girl knows she has rights and she knows how to exercise them. Not only is she aware of social problems, she also has the voice to speak up against them. When it comes to her own marriage, she will be able to stand up for her choice to choose when and whom she marries.

One interviewee, Fatima from Fez, a single mother aged 18 years old claimed that it is important to underline that girls' education is the top priority of both educators and policy makers. It is by educating girls that we assure the fact that they know their rights, and protect them and also we endow girls with certain independence and making decision of their lives. And as Christie Edwards noted in her study about Morocco: And as Christie Edwards mentions: "I believe that Morocco is well on its way to achieving its goals for national literacy

and a stronger economy, as long as it continues to make women a central focus and priority.”

When asked about whether they agree with the idea that empowering girls and their families socially and economically can help reduce violence against women and can help reduce the phenomenon of school drop out girls, 40 percent of my respondents highlighted the importance of the economic condition in helping girls pursuing their studies. However 60 percent emphasized the idea of sensitizing girls and their families about this gender equality culture within the family, fighting patriarchal mentality and attitudes towards girls and women to eradicate negative gender stereotypes that are mainly at the root of both dropping out of school of girls and gender based violence. They have also stressed the government care about improving the education system in Morocco.

To conclude, I suggest that it is high time to think seriously of applying a law that protects women and girls from violence. There are a lot of good things that Morocco has achieved but there are still a lot of things to do.

It is I think a common responsibility of all institutions of all institutions, family, school, media, civil society, and international organizations to collaborate in order to protect girls and women from all kinds of violence. And this can only be achieved through the reign of a progressive young king Mohammed IV who supported the women issue from the first throne speech, March 9, 1999. We demand that the reforms evoked by the king Mohammed IV in his opening discourse in the International Forum of Human Rights November 27, 2015 in Marrakech should be implemented, notably, “the adoption of some laws on the domestic violence against women, and the lifting of all forms of injustice, discrimination and violence against Moroccan women.”

I close up this paper by asking the following question: what role do men and boys could actually have in combating gender-based violence?

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> According to Cherrak, dropping out of schools is an economic hairline and an educational manifestation through the returns of school which is very weak; it interacts in its understanding with; or it is closer two concepts that interact with two predominant phenomenon which are linked to the failure at school or at the obstacles that children or teenagers may face up :

<sup>2</sup> This point will be taken as one case of the drop out schools that have either been subjected to violence - either at school by their female teachers or male teachers / that was one of the causes that my interviewees faced up: Here I will talk about the different types of violence/verbal ; physical ; sexual ...

<sup>3</sup> The failure of those students are linked to personal characteristics-such as the competence; skills of those children: What justifies this failure is the academic assessment 3inda ilmtiHan you3azzou lmarŞu aw youhan.

<sup>4</sup> Verbal and or physical violence can be considered as one of the obstacles that stand against the strategies of motivating teenagers and children inside their classroom; and such behaviors can be considered as frustrating factors that can reduce the value or the importance of these entirely positive motives that those children may have for work; but other styles may enhance for work; but either style may enhance and bring desire or stimulate children to achieve a specific thing. All the above mentioned factors my respond to the deep causes for the academic failure as a receipt for pedagogical studies by not making this recipe reaches at the sociological level but by considering the academic failure as only part of the discourse and the children's practices.



## **L'ÉMERGENCE DES ONGS AMAZIGHES FÉMININES, LEURS OBJECTIFS ET LEURS ACTIONS**

*Meryem DEMNATI*

C'est dans un contexte de sentiment d'injustice que le mouvement amazighe verra le jour dans les années 60. Il fera longtemps l'objet d'une répression sévère, l'arabisme et l'islamisme étaient alors les seules normes de référence. Après le discours royal d'Ajdir du Roi Mohamed VI du 17 octobre 2001 sur la reconnaissance de l'Amazighité du Maroc et ensuite son officialisation par la constitution en Juillet 2011, les associations amazighes se multiplieront alors sur tout le territoire puis se spécialiseront dans plusieurs domaines : littérature, enseignement, théâtre, cinéma et poésie, droit à la terre et droits des femmes.

Avec le mouvement de la rue du 20 février 2011 au Maroc, le mouvement amazigh s'est trouvé dans un autre tournant de l'histoire. Avec toutes ses composantes, il intègre ce courant de révolte revendiquant une Constitution démocratique incluant la langue amazighe officielle. Il est alors à l'avant-garde avec les autres forces progressistes de la société civile, appelant à l'édification d'une société juste et égalitaire, considérant la cause amazighe comme partie intégrante du projet démocratique. Les amazighs seront ainsi présents dans toutes les coordinations du 20 février et ses manifestations où les drapeaux amazighes flotteront dans toutes les villes. Un document complet intitulé « Appel Timmouzgha pour la démocratie » élaboré par un groupe d'intellectuels amazighes avec à leur tête l'académicien Mohamed Chafik, secouera les derniers tenants de l'arabisme par son ton ferme et décidé et son contenu sans détours. Une bataille importante sera enfin gagnée, celle de l'officialisation de la langue amazighe. Mais d'autres batailles attendent encore dont l'application effective sur le terrain de la constitution pour une véritable reconnaissance de l'amazighité et les droits des femmes avec une loi organique qui devra faciliter et garantir la mise en œuvre de l'officialisation de la langue amazighe et pour laquelle le mouvement amazighe exige une approche participative avec toutes les composantes de la société civile et particulièrement les associations amazighes.

Le mouvement amazigh compte aujourd'hui près de mille associations dispatchées sur tout le territoire marocain. Grandes villes, petites villes, campagnes, montagnes, toutes ces associations s'activeront sur tout le territoire, malgré le peu de moyens financiers et s'organiseront souvent en coordinations de régions. Des associations amazighes spécialisées dans des domaines voit le jour, tels que Tirra, association des écrivains amazighes, la confédération nationale des associations des enseignants de la langue amazighe, l'association isnni n ourgh du cinéma, association nationale du théâtre amazighe, des fédérations des associations pour le droit à la terre, l'association des poètes traditionnels... et des associations féminines amazighes ...

*Pourquoi assiste-t-on à l'émergence des associations féminines amazighes durant cette dernière décennie ? Quelle est leur particularité face aux autres associations féminines marocaines ? Comment conjuguent-elles les diverses luttes pour leurs droits à la fois en tant que femmes et en tant qu'amazighes ?*

### **Pourquoi la création des associations féminines amazighes ?**

- Sentiment que la langue et la culture ne sont pas prises en compte ;
- Sentiment d'exclusion en tant qu'amazighes dans les différentes associations féminines existantes ;
- Parmi les droits que revendiquent ces femmes, le droit à leur langue et leur culture conjugué à leurs droits en tant que femmes ;
- Pour une amélioration de leur situation de femmes sans renonciation à leurs droits linguistique et culturels ;
- Un élément qui jusqu'alors manquait au mouvement féminin marocain : l'Amazighité.

### **Leurs particularités ?**

Ce qui fait la particularité de la femme Amazighe, c'est qu'elle est doublement agressée: agressée dans sa féminité et agressée dans son amazighité. La difficulté pour la femme amazighe est double. Non seulement il lui faudra lutter pour arracher ses droits légitimes et matrimoniaux, mais il lui faudra aussi en tant que principale gardienne et trésorière de la Culture Amazighe lutter contre sa marginalisation. L'analphabétisme et l'ignorance sont le lot de la grande majorité d'entre elles, ce qui défavorise leur intégration dans

la société. Lorsque enfin on les scolarise; elles se retrouvent face à deux langues étrangères (L'arabe et le français)... ce qui entraîne la dévalorisation de leur langue et culture et cause souvent la perte des valeurs autochtones face à des valeurs importées du Moyen orient ou de l'occident. Face à cette situation de double dominance (masculine et culturelle); comment faire pour conquérir sa liberté sans pour cela rompre avec sa culture d'origine???? Il s'agit d'engager un combat à la fois contre une domination masculine qui relègue les femmes à un rang inférieur mais aussi de mener un combat pour la reconnaissance effective de la culture et de la langue amazighes en tant que langue officielle dans la constitution et son utilisation dans tous les domaines de la vie publique.

### ***Nées de cette réalité, quelles formes prennent-elles ?***

Tout d'abord, il faut rappeler que ces associations féminines amazighes font partie intégrante du mouvement identitaire amazighe.

- Au départ, les militantes amazighes se sont organisées sous la forme de commissions ou de sections féminines à l'intérieur de quelques associations amazighes converties en associations de développement tels que l'association Tamaynut, Azetta, Thaziri, Assid, Observatoire Amazighe des Droits et Libertés...
- Puis cette dernière décennie, on a assisté à l'émergence d'associations amazighes spécifiquement féminines telles que l'association Tinhinan à Khémisset, l'association de la voix de la femme amazighe IMSLI à Rabat, l'association Anarouz à Taroudant, Association Thaziri à El Hoceima et l'Association Tinhinan à Tiznit, l'association Tamghart à Essaouira, l'association Tayri à Agadir...

### ***Leur objectif***

L'objectif principal de ces associations, est l'amélioration des conditions de vie des femmes amazighes, par des actions conjuguant leurs luttes pour leurs droits à la fois en tant que femmes et en tant qu'amazighes, en militant sur ces deux fronts.

**Sous forme de rencontres régionales de proximité, d'ateliers de formations, de caravane de sensibilisation, d'activités culturelles ciblées et de colonies de vacances familiales, voici leurs actions :**

- La sensibilisation et éducation de la femme amazighe à ses droits politiques, économiques et culturels et sociaux ;



- La contribution à l'utilisation de la langue amazighe dans toutes les actions de vulgarisation et de promotion de ses droits ;
- Œuvrer pour l'alphabétisation fonctionnelle des femmes en langue amazighe ;
- La promotion de projets coopératifs et le développement des activités débouchant sur le développement autonome ;
- La promotion et le développement de la propriété collective et du savoir traditionnel ;
- Les actions en vue de la préservation de la santé maternelle et infantile ;
- La promotion et encouragement de la scolarisation des filles
- Contribution de manière efficace et efficiente à tous les chantiers ouverts dans le cadre des droits des femmes et de la reconnaissance de l'amazighité ;
- L'échange et l'interaction entre les femmes des différentes associations féminines au Maroc et dans Tamazgha ;
- Œuvrer pour le renforcement de ses capacités à travers des programmes et des activités dans les domaines d'éducation sur les droits humains, l'éducation sanitaire, le soutien psychique, l'orientation juridique et l'alphabétisation juridique en langue amazighe au profit des femmes amazighe ;
- S'inspirer du droit coutumier amazighe dans lequel la violence contre la femme est sanctionné et où les biens sont partagés à égalité entre la femme et l'homme après un divorce ;
- Œuvrer pour la diffusion des valeurs universelles dans le système éducatif (manuels scolaires, ouvrages pour enfants et formation des enseignants) ;
- Doter la femme amazighe de moyens pour l'impliquer dans le combat contre la violence et contre toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes ainsi que dans le combat pour l'égalité et la citoyenneté.

### ***Leurs partenaires?***

- Associations culturelles amazighes de développement,
- Associations féminines marocaines : FDLF, Itto, Anaruz,
- Organisations des droits humains (AMDH, OMDH...),

- Elles sont aussi membres des coordinations des associations féminines marocaines telles que : Printemps de la dignité, Coalition pour l'application de l'article 19, Coalition pour l'égalité...),
- Elles sont membres du Forum des femmes amazighes de Tamazgha (Afrique du nord et Sahel) créé à Tanger en 2011 pour permettre un échange et interaction entre les femmes des différentes régions de Tamazgha : Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Libye, Azawad, Niger, Burkina Faso et îles Canaries,
- Fières de leur africanité, les femmes amazighes du Maroc ont participé à la fondation de l'AFAA (Associations des Femmes Autochtones d'Afrique) en avril 1996 à Agadir puis à Nairobi et à Ouagadougou avec d'autres organisations féminines africaines comme les associations des femmes touaregs, des femmes Masai, des femmes Pygmées, des femmes Batwa, des femmes Mbororos, des femmes Pokot, etc., L'objectif de cette organisation est de défendre et de promouvoir les droits humains et les intérêts des femmes et peuples autochtones d'Afrique. L'Associations des Femmes Autochtones d'Afrique s'est donné comme tâche de participer d'une manière effective à la promotion et à la protection de leurs droits dans l'intérêt direct de leurs familles, de leurs communautés, de leur pays et de toute l'humanité. L'aspiration au respect des droits humains en général, de la femme et des peuples autochtones en particulier, ne pourrait se concrétiser sans leur participation. Ceci implique la nécessité de renforcer les capacités de leurs organisations et réseaux à tous les niveaux, afin que les femmes puissent aller au-delà de tous les obstacles et préjugés pour s'épanouir et aspirer à un bonheur digne de ce nom : l'émancipation de toutes les femmes.

### **Les moyens**

- La coopération, le partenariat et la coordination avec les différentes associations féminines amazighes ou marocaines en général ;
- La coopération, le partenariat et la coordination avec les différentes associations féminines amazighes de Tamazgha et d'Afrique en général ;

- La coopération, le partenariat et la coordination avec les organisations nationales et internationales qui partagent les mêmes valeurs ;
- La coopération avec les organismes professionnels ;
- Exploiter tous les moyens juridiques légaux ;
- Trouver des fonds nationaux et internationaux pour la réussite des actions.

## **THE REAL AND THE VIRTUAL: BEYOND PHYSICAL VIOLENCE**

*Faiza SHEREEN*

### **The Virtual Space of Social Media**

In an article entitled "Social Media: Enemy of the State or Power to the People?" *Pierre Omidyar, founder and chairman of eBay affirms,*

My view is pretty straightforward - I believe that social media is a tool of liberation and empowerment... the freedom to communicate openly and honestly is not something to be taken for granted. In countries where traditional media is a tool of control, these new and truly social channels have the power to radically alter our world (*The WorldPost, 27 February 2014*).

One would imagine that, in the MENA region, the new media's easy accessibility and relative freedom from hegemonic power would be particularly encouraging for women and girls whose circumscribed existence, limit their capacity to voice positions and to act politically or socially. Yet, it took very little time for the deeply engrained habits of objectification of the female to surface in the new media in the form of what has come to be named " cyber sexual harassment," thus invading this new and free space and colonizing it as an extension of the patriarchal domain where gender-based violence can exist unhindered. Whether in the media or on the streets, violence against women increased as the virtual constructs of the female nourished a patriarchal resistance to the woman's demands in the real world.

The revolution of January, 2011, heralded a new era in Egyptian history. The end of Hosni Mubarak's repressive regime was expected by many to lead to democratic alternatives that would empower the exploited and the underprivileged-including women. But the course of reform is never without hurdles and setbacks. Mubarak's replacement by Morsi was neither as revolutionary as the dream was nor as dismantling of the old regime as the neo-liberals expected. According to Yasmine Nagaty's article posted on Almonitor on March 17, 2013, both Mubarak's allegedly secular regime and Morsi's Islamic regime rejected the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Nagaty affirms that :

while many of Morsi's spokesmen use religious rhetoric to reject CEDAW, we should not forget that as far as economic policies are concerned, Morsi's regime was no different from Mubarak's. Existing economic institutions remained in place... Women remain within the same realm of neglect in which they existed during Mubarak's days. The only difference is that it is simply convenient for Brotherhood members and their Islamist allies to use religious reference to defend their policies" ("Women Face Same Barriers in Morsi's Egypt").

If Mubarak's reign had given women little hope for progress, Morsi's party gave reason for alarm. Confirming the regime's position concerning some of the most urgent issues facing Egyptian women, including domestic violence and sexual abuse, Osama Yehia Abu Salama, a Brotherhood family expert, was quoted in an article in *The New York Times* saying: "A woman needs to be confined within a framework that is controlled by the man of the house" (Kirkpatrick and El Sheik). But the new media provided exactly the opposite of the confinement proposed by Salama—here a woman could overcome the limitation of physical confinement via virtual freedom in cyber space. Asmaa Mahfouz, a young Egyptian woman who has been credited with having sparked the protests that began the uprising in January 2011 in Cairo, is a case in point, reflecting the potential for agency that social media made room for. In a video blog posted to Facebook on 18 January, she called on Egyptians to demand their human rights. Within days, the video went viral.

The revolution had provided a brief respite as women joined with men to protest, but in the post-Mubarak period of lack of security and undefined roles of the police and the military, a general state of chaos became the breeding ground for violence and lawlessness. Women experienced various forms of harassment and increasingly violent sexual assaults in public spaces. The author of an article in *Tavaana* entitled "Taking Back Egypt's Streets: The Harassmap Campaign to End Sexual Harassment" laments that "Cairo's Tahrir Square, known around the world as the heart of the revolution, swiftly transformed into an unwelcoming place for women; on the very night that Mubarak fell, CBS correspondent Lara Logan and many other women were sexually assaulted by mobs." According to Amnesty International, the writer reports, "Testimonies from victims and those attempting to save them paint a frightening picture: tens

if not hundreds of men surrounding the victims with countless hands tearing off clothes and veils ... One British journalist described her ordeal: 'Men began to rip off my clothes. I was stripped naked ... Hundreds of men pulled my limbs apart and threw me around... All I could see was leering faces, more and more faces sneering and jeering as I was tossed around like fresh meat among starving lions' (Diana Elwahaty qtd. in "Taking Back Egypt's streets: The Harassmap Capain to End Sexual Harassment"). As one Egyptian women's rights activist put it, "We do not want to use the term 'harassment.' What is happening today is sexual terrorism."

Perhaps the violence in this instance represents the primal savagery in the human psyche that manifests itself in a state of anarchy like the "beast" in William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*. Savage behavior and mob violence are neither new nor limited to the people of the MENA region. But what is particularly significant here is that this behavior targets the female half of the public. That the West seems to see these conditions in terms of the Islamic identity and the Arab patriarchal hegemony of the culture is an unfortunate deterrent from the pursuit of open and non-predetermined inquiry.

### **Virtual Constructs of the Arabo-Islamic Woman's Identity**

As Amal Amireh claims in "Arab Women Writers" Problems and Prospects":

Historically, the West's interest in Arab women is part of its interest in and hostility to Islam. This hostility was central to the colonialist project, which cast women as victims to be rescued from Muslim male violence. The fixation on the veil, the harem, excision, and polygamy made Arab women symbols of a region and a religion that were at once exotic, violent, and inferior... Most reviewers of Arabic writers conclude that Arab-Muslim culture "is vastly different from [read: inferior to] the West," especially regarding the treatment of women (*Al Jadid* 2.10 1996).

The response to this approach is long and the subject of another paper-but it must be pointed out that seeing the Arab Muslim women in terms of veils and hymens, harems and polygamy is a western virtual construct and does violence to the reality of their identities. This same use of the hierarchical binary of self and other has been

superimposed on and therefore used as a denial of the basic and universal gender-based power manipulation in the colonial enterprise.

The British Proconsul-general for the British occupation of Egypt, Lord Cromer, spoke in 1916 of the British project for Egypt: "It is absurd to suppose Europe will look on as a passive spectator whilst the retrograde government based on purely Muhammadan principles and oriental ideas [i.e Islam], is established in Egypt. The material interests at stake are too important ... the new generation of Egyptians has to be persuaded or FORCED into imbibing the true spirit of Western civilisation" (179-181). Lord Cromer then continues: "The position of women in Egypt, and Mohammedan countries generally, is, therefore a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that elevation of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of Western civilisation" (Modern Egypt 526). And while Lord Cromer was using "the position of women in Egypt, and Mohammedan countries" for political objectives, he was a member and one-time president of the UK 'Men's League for Opposing the Suffrage of Women' campaigning AGAINST giving British women the vote. Like the Brotherhood claims, Lord Cromer's use of altruistic principles (e.g. women's rights) reflects a politician's double standards; to further his agenda, he claims principles he neither believed in nor upheld.

The denial of women's innate rights to take control of their own lives is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a feature of Arab culture nor can it be ascribed to Islam except for political purposes by both the so-called Islamists and their opponents.

One has only to go to the most universal texts to find passages describing women in negative terms. These damning judgments can be found in most scriptures, in most cultures, and in most ages. Several examples from the Old Testament, for instance, describe women in morally negative terms: the acts of incest by Lot's two daughters who seduce their father (Genesis 19:30-36), Delilah's wily seduction of Samson to find the source of his strength (Judges 16), the stoning to death recommended for a bride not found to be a virgin (Deuteronomy 22:13-21). Verse 21 says: "Then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die: because she hath wrought folly in Israel, to play the whore in her father's house: so shalt thou put evil away from among you"-all these instances confirm

the view that women are considered sexual predators, deceitful, and worthy of special punishment.

In the face of violence and chaos at home, and unmitigated prejudice and deliberate or unconscious bigotry historically and in the international sphere, how do women in the region negotiate their position and protect themselves as civil members of their communities and the international community?

### ***A Patriarchal Paradigm***

With the emergence of new media, a new generation of young adults had finally found a forum to voice their opinions and act as agents of change in a civil society. Yet we see that despite the unprecedented success of the call to action articulated by Asmaa Mahfouz and other young activists, a wave of increasing mob hostility led to physical and other forms of gender-based violence. A report published by Amnesty International entitled "Circles of Hell" Domestic, Public and State Violence Against Women in Egypt" in 2015 highlights some important factors in the phenomenon of escalating violence against women. The report asserts that Violence is further facilitated by the deep discrimination against women in law and practice, the institutionalized attitudes that discriminate against women – including the idea that a woman must "obey" her husband, or that she is somehow responsible for bringing violence upon herself - and the failure of the authorities to prevent, combat and punish violence against women.

The most important point made in this report is the reference to the often used argument (even by women) that victims of physical abuse, even rape, bring it upon themselves, let us say, for instance, by the immodest way they dress. Yes, indeed, one should point an accusatory finger. But not at the indecently dressed woman; rather, at the person who justifies her victimization. The victim may be foolishly dressed, may even be guilty of deliberately attracting attention. She may be criticized at length. But to justify the crime perpetrated against her in the name of religion or justice is a Machiavellian reversal of the roles of the aggressor and the victim and is an injustice that cannot be tolerated. Such a position would be no different than to find thieves justified for shop-lifting because the shop keepers displayed their merchandise.



Psychologist, Steve Taylor, tells us "The oppression of women stems largely from men's desire for power and control. The same need which, throughout history, has driven men to try to conquer and subjugate other groups or nations, and to oppress other classes or groups in their own society, drives them to dominate and oppress women" ("Why Men Oppress Women: The Psychology of Male Domination").

Taylor explains the "terrible saga of man's inhumanity to woman" as he calls it, in terms of a basic misogyny, whereby women are seen as impure and innately sinful. He traces this view to the 15th to the 18th centuries' witch-killing mania in Europe and America as well as to the three Abrahamic traditions. He quotes the Jewish Testament of Reuben "Women are evil, my children...they use wiles and try to ensnare [man] by their charms...They lay plots in their hearts against men: by the way they adorn themselves they first lead their minds astray, and by a look they instill the poison, and then in the act itself they take them captive... So shun fornication, my children and command your wives and daughters not to adorn their heads and faces."

Taylor links the negative character attributed to woman to the view - encouraged by religions - "that instincts and sensual desires are base and sinful." If men associated themselves with the "purity" of the mind, then women would be associated with the "corruption" of the body. Despite man's control of her, the woman is capable of arousing uncontrollable sexual impulses. Taylor concludes that "The last 6000 years of man's inhumanity to woman can partly be seen as a revenge for this." Escape into the virtual, as we have seen, has proven unsuccessful. As Amr Abdelatty points out, "Thanks to the widespread use of mobile devices and social media, sexual harassment is no longer confined to a direct physical encounter between the harasser and the victim. Through a phenomenon called 'cyber sexual harassment,' the harasser can now reach potential victims in their homes" (Almonitor 26 April 2015).

The reality of the experience of women historically and universally seems to suggest that we are ignoring a basic premise we have to deal with in order to eradicate gender-based violence. All other actions, though important, provide ways to cope with the problem, not to remove its cause. And that basic premise is the predetermined habit of defining the world, our genders, our existence, and our very souls, in terms of a patriarchal paradigm creating a virtual identity of the woman, prescribed by male premises.

### ***Luce Irigaray and a Theory of Difference***

Acknowledging the power of the patriarchal paradigm, and its significance in terms of understanding the plight of women in the MENA region (if not universally) may be elucidated by the analysis of the French feminist and cultural theorist, Luce Irigaray. In an article entitled "Being Two, How many Eyes Have We?", Irigaray addresses the issue of gender differentiation through an examination of how we see—that is, how "seeing" informs us. Seeing, as she states, is a form of understanding. "Seeing" indicates a relationship with an object. We see "a thing." Further, seeing is always equivalent to recognizing. So when I see something, I recognize a form, a concept. She says: "I recognize something that already has a face according to a paradigm, a model that I have been taught" [italics my own]. Thus seeing corresponds to knowing AGAIN. "We submit ourselves to a model [already] learned." We even identify living objects—e.g. a tree—according to how we recognize it, as a palm tree, for example. "We give it its meaning because we have learned a code that it seems to fit and not because we observe a reality." In fact, we do not "see" all that does not correspond with what we already know of palm trees; and, if we do, we label such features "abnormal." [italics my own]. "Objects constrain us to perceive their forms according to a pre-given intention." If seeing is recognizing what you already know, then what you do NOT see is the distinguishing identity (144-45).

The culmination of Irigaray's speculations is her theory of difference and its paramount importance in gender relations. What Irigaray is in fact calling for is a rejection of the paradigm of hierarchical binaries, where each concept is identified in terms of its opposite, thus NOT on its own terms (Woman=not man/ black=not white/muslim=not Christian). She concludes that:

Our way of looking, our look itself can unceasingly be born again if we consider the other as other, with respect for the mystery of the difference existing between us. Indeed it prevents us from reducing him, or her, to an object or to an image that we can appropriate, take as a part of our own world, of our own self. (150)

Irigaray's concept of difference and of different and separate subjectivities may seem less original than indeed it is. Western philosophy at least has always constructed meaning on the basis of

a singular subject. The Platonic original forms are always unique-reproduced, copied in the millions, but the supremacy of the one, ideal concept dominates all imperfect reproductions of itself. The model of the human being remained unchanged: one, singular, solitary, historically masculine—the paradigmatic Western adult male, rational, capable. Others are only copies of the ideal man, identified hierarchically, with varying degrees of shortcomings. Irigaray rejects Simone De Beauvoir's goal of being man's equal on his ground—like him. Irigaray posits that this desire is impossible to realize, because should the woman seek the space of sameness with man—she is measuring herself by the male model of which she must inevitably be a very poor copy, if she can even approximate it. On the other hand, as woman, the subject becomes the model, an other model, determined on its own terms, not in the unprivileged position of the object in a subject-object relationship, but as subject in a relationship of two subjects. [italics my own]. Irigaray sees that the entire question of the Other has been poorly formulated since the other is always seen as the other of the same (woman as not-man), the other of the subject itself, rather than an/other subject, "irreducible to the masculine subject and sharing equivalent dignity."

So, how do women in the region negotiate their position and protect themselves as civil members of their communities? The answer is no less than by effecting a change of paradigm—establishing a relationship of subject to subject that honors and respects the gender differences. Attempting to find justice and equality within the current paradigm, built on the inherent rejection of femaleness as a shortcoming (Freud's phallocentrism does not help) and on hierarchical binaries of opposition would seem to be futile. But a paradigm shift does not occur overnight, and in the meantime, the perpetration of violence against the women and girls in the region cannot be tolerated. Measures must be taken and are being taken.

It is important to remember that violence is not limited to inflicting physical pain, but is manifested in every act that denies the individual her right to self-determination. One cannot help but think of Najib Mahfouz's Amina or Charlotte Brontë's Bertha, the madwoman in the attic in *Jane Eyre*, suffering entrapment in lives prescribed to them, victims of a far greater crime than one incident of physical violence. One can only imagine the de-veined existence of Amina, or that of Bertha driven to madness. The kind of violence against the other

in these cases of physical, psychological, and social confinement represents the power dynamic at the basis of a misogynous relationship based on a virtual, constructed female identity that can only be eradicated by a paradigm change. This will come, but in the words of E.M. Forster when he envisions understanding between east and west, a similar situation of a hierarchical binary, "No, not yet..."

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## **GLOBAL CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GENDER-BASED-VIOLENCE AS TRANSCULTURAL LEARNING EXPERIENCES ? REFLECTIONS ON THE AMBIVALENCES OF 'CAUSES CÉLÈBRES'**

*Ulrike LINGEN-ALI and Lydia POTTS*

### **Dominant discourses and GBV**

Dominant discourses in the West – more specifically in Germany – conceptualize the MENA or in general Muslim contexts – as largely homogenous spaces of hyper masculinity and patriarchal order where unsanctioned GBV is omnipresent. This essentialist-culturalist paradigm is widely reflected in and constantly (re-)produced by various media. This includes numerous monographs: biographical narratives about or by women who –often after decade long ordeals– managed to escape violent families and communities. Popular bookshops e.g. in many train stations offer these books bought and read in large numbers by a primarily female audience who considers these accumulated 'true stories' as common knowledge informing enlightened public opinion.

Heroines, outstanding individuals, singular women fighting GBV and oppression in the MENA and beyond are also the basis of the meanwhile almost regularly presented 'causes célèbres' in global including German media.

### **GBV in Muslim Contexts: Some Global 'Causes Célèbres'**

Most of the 'famous cases' listed here are related to court cases: women standing up to misogynistic laws and courts violating human rights and women seeking justice for GBV. They have attracted global attention – either the woman linked to legal case as alleged offender or as victim or as legal counsel. As several other presenters have pointed out, the legal system, the actual laws and/or their interpretation, implementation or lack of implementation are key dimensions with regard to what is perceived as GBV and how it is dealt with publicly.

<b>Year of publicity</b>	<b>Name, Year of Birth</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>Position/ Case</b>	<b>Awards</b>	<b>Publications</b>
<b>2003</b>	ShirinEbadi (* 1947)	Iran	Lawyer, Judge, exiled in 2009	2003: Nobel Peace Prize (exiled in 2009) 2004: 100 Most Powerful Women Numerous honorary doctorate	Books: memoirs, autobiography, refugee rights
<b>2005</b>	Amina Lawal (* 1972)	Nigeria	Death sentence 2002 for adultery	---	Fictional novel by Will Ferguson
<b>2005</b>	Hawa Ibrahim (* 1968)	Nigeria	Lawyer to Amina Lawal	2005: European Parliament Sakharov Prize 2005: Italian Order of Merit 2006: Honorary Citizen of Paris	Book: Practicing Sharia Law, interviews
<b>2008</b>	Nojoud Ali (* 1998)	Yemen	Child bride, [fights child and forced marriage]	2008: Woman of the year (Glamour) 2009: World Hope Award	Autobiography (with French journalist)
<b>2009</b>	Lubna Hussain (* 1973)	Sudan	Journalist [challenged dress code & imprisonment, pending flogging]	2011: TOP 100 Women (Guardian)	Articles, book, interviews
<b>2011</b>	Tawakkul Karman (* 1979)	Yemen	Journalist, Politician	2011: Nobel Peace Prize 2011: Top 100 global thinkers	Newspaper articles, speeches, interviews
<b>2012/ 2014</b>	Malala Yousafzai (* 1997)	Pakistan	Student [campaigns for education for girls – survived attempted murder]	Numerous Awards and Prizes, among them: 2011: National Peace Prize, Pakistan 2013: Woman of the Year (Glamour) 2014: Nobel Peace Prize	Book: Memoir, (with British journalist)
<b>2015</b>	Farkhunda (* 1988)	Afghanistan	Student [accused of blasphemy and lynched]	---	---

## **Critique of 'Causes Célèbres'**

Global public attention in the cases mentioned here is granted to individual women fighting for rights in outstanding situations – such as murder or attempted murder, pending death penalty, lynching and flogging. In some of these cases, the support by social movements and feminist networks, in others support by feminist professionals or ad-hoc women's groups is crucial but barely recognized by media coverage and in award ceremonies. Personalization and individualization tend to contribute to victimization. Specific media narratives reduce e.g. Malala to the "darling of the Western media" and a potential tool of political propaganda. As such, her and other 'cause célèbre' stories may fit imperialist, racist or orientalist narratives that have long been institutionalized: the West rescues a poor Muslim woman from the barbaric and uncivilized Islamic others. Along those lines, Malala's biography is exploited to justify military interventions, drone strikes, antipathy for Muslims, and pity for Muslim women. She is thus constructed as an object, her resistance and agency are negated.

Even if not going this far, global media attention and international awards might on one hand be useful for individuals and the overall awareness of GBV. On the other hand, they also aggravate problems and mobilize rejections i.e. hinder the cause – the combating of GBV – which they seemingly promote.

## **'Causes Célèbres' As Counter-Narratives**

However, the exclusive perspective on the shortcomings of the public focuses on these 'causes célèbres' reflects a reductive perspective, ignoring the potential to provide counter-narratives. Nearly all women mentioned raised their voices against patriarchal, oppressive, violent structures, conditions, attitudes and laws – before and after they gained global media attention. As 'causes célèbres', as globally prominent personalities, new forums are opening up to them – that most of them are able to use aptly. Although they are represented by the media – and no one can fully control her/his media image –, they also use interviews, speeches, articles and books to present their perspectives and at least at times reach a global audience.

Although interwoven with hegemonic discourses, these interventions deconstruct homogenized images, disrupt dominant messages and at times turn patriarchal and orientalist tropes upside down. Some brief



examples: Malala is speaking publicly and decidedly as a Muslim girl, not joining in the condemnation of the Taliban and clearly refusing to legitimize any Western military interventions in the region and beyond. Tawakkul Karman speaks as a committed Islamist – promoting women’s rights and working for democracy.

The funeral of Farkhunda, dubbed “the martyr of Kabul” became a media event, the still rare representation of Afghan women’s collective outrage in two connected events, that both made it to German newspaper. The funeral with Muslim women as pallbearers is religiously highly symbolic and breaking with tradition, and the demonstration claiming women’s rights as citizens and civil society actors. Feminist critique should emphasize, promote and value these disruptions of dominant discourse.

### **Promoting Transnational Feminist Spaces and Solidarity Combating GBV**

Interpreted as counter narratives, the ‘causes célèbres’ constitute elements of transnational feminist spaces bridging e.g. the MENA and the West – but these need to be taken further, a much broader basis is necessary and existing in terms of networks and to further strengthen transversal feminist politics as the basis for solidarity.

Among the key pre-requisites for transnational alliances is the self-reflexive dimension namely in the West which includes the understanding of GBV as an unresolved issue in all societies. The first ever EU-wide study on violence against women, representative for the EU and each member state, was published just last year, in 2014. Among the results: Just over one in five women in the EU has experienced physical and/or sexual violence from either a current or previous partner, and one in twenty women in the EU has been raped, according to these data.

Information about the continued prevalence of GBV in Western societies needs to be complemented with knowledge about the historicization of the understanding of violence, e.g. marital rape is considered a crime in Germany since the 1980s/1990s. When the issue was first raised in parliament in the early 1980s, the majority of representatives reacted with laughter and jokes. In other words, what is understood and delegitimized as violence, namely as GBV, has changed over time and quite recently.

Transnational feminist spaces also require constant reflections on elements of domination, including stardom, elitism and exclusivism as Laurel Weldon did.

In a recent paper, Nikita Dhawan voices a more radical critique and reflects on transnational feminist alliances as 'impossible solidarities' – that might "continue to reproduce feudal relations despite contrary intentions" (p.140). When progressive activists and intellectuals intervene 'benevolently' in the struggle of subaltern groups for greater recognition and rights, they reinforce the very power relations that they seek to demolish"(p.145). Critique not only of the postcolonial state but also of international civil society...

"Large sections of the rural population and the urban poor in the postcolony have the formal status of citizens, but they cannot access the organs of the state in the same way as 'proper' members of civil society can" (p. 150) – in accordance with Spivak.

She argues that the process of desubalternization is persistently hindered by the vanguardism of international civil society, i.e. the bypassing or replacing of the state with non-state actors. "Elite actors in civil society obtain remarkable amounts of political power and access to transnational public spheres, without being directly elected by the people whom they claim to represent" (feudality without feudalism). While this thought should not be prematurely rejected, it is also of importance that by the 'causes célèbres' discussed here, the state is constantly challenged and key addressee. We might question to what extent subalterns are involved, but all cases are not bypassing the state but rather questioning the legitimacy of its acts resp. the acts of its representatives. Civil society actors, namely feminist networks, support the issues, bring in expertise and connect this with media, but they are not driving the process.

### **Teaching Gender Studies**

Gender Studies programs – not only in the West – constitute spaces to potentially deconstruct dominant (media) images and patriarchal readings. To develop and distribute counter-narratives necessarily includes self-reflexive, anti-solipsistic approaches and the questioning of civil societies' processes e.g. well-meaning charity and development industry.

These are pre-requisites for contributions to the development of transnational feminist agendas and the training of professionals as the basis of transnational solidarity. Study programs are also spaces of multidirectional, inter-generational knowledge production.

In order to deliver, Gender Studies need diversity on both, the student and the teacher level. Descriptive representation, the physical presence of e.g. Gender scholars from the MENA or from Muslim contexts or various others contribute to the deconstruction of dominant representations and the building of alternative public space and discourse. Thus, transnational academic teaching – implemented as contextualized and multi-sited knowledge transfer– blends theory with didactics. It includes the allocation of resources and creates dialogical structures of research and teaching.

### **Conclusion**

Back to the 'causes célèbres' and in general, prominent women addressing GBV: all these cases might function as a point of departure, but need to be contextualized within broader – global – structures of violence including GBV, imperialism and oppression, exploitation, silencing as well as resistance and empowerment. This is a crucial task within Gender Studies programs and beyond.

What the 'causes célèbres' share with all other solidarity efforts is that they are both "indispensable and yet inadequate. We exist in this double bind, a working without guarantees, which bears within itself the necessity of its own critique." (Dhawan, p.163) And while on the analytical level as a result of uneven power relations, transnational solidarity might be deemed impossible, the feminist project – including the fight of GBV – depends on it, locally, nationally and globally.

## **RADICAL ISLAM AND WOMEN'S WEAKENING STATUS**

*Khadija ARFAOUI*

*"Women's cause... must not be presented in the very cramped context of identity. The latter does not have a rigid meaning, but quite the opposite, it represents a dynamic in which any futurist vision can be perceived."*

Noura Borsali

### **Introduction**

This paper focuses on the changes in women's status in the Muslim world, with a special focus on Tunisia since the end of the twentieth century. Tunisian women would live under the supervision and control of men until the promulgation of the Code of Personal Status (CPS) in 1956. That autonomy became severely threatened after the Arab Spring (January 2011) following a sweeping Islamist movement that, from Iran to Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan claimed a return to the Sharia in order to restore a true Muslim identity, they claimed. To succeed, their program had to restrict women's whereabouts and level of education so as to place them under the absolute authority of men. It was against such a way of life that Habib Bourguiba based his development program. When he took the presidency of the newly independent Tunisia in 1956, he took immediate action to give the Tunisian people a higher value of their identity through a developed system of education and healthcare shared equally by men and women. He did not just say that women needed and deserved equal rights to those of men, but the lawyer he was, knew the significance of legislation and he immediately enacted laws to ensure enactment and protection of these rights. Had he not done so then, the CPS might have never been brought to life. The CPS allowed a revolutionary change in the fabric of life. Several international instruments were also ratified by Tunisia in the following years but this was done with caution so as not to create animosity with the religious forces of Ezzeitouna Mosque. We are interested here more particularly in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against Women (CEDAW), ratified by Tunisia in 1985, although with some reservations. International laws being stronger than governmental decrees and national constitutions, Tunisia made

reservations on the articles that did not conform to Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution and maintained in the 2014 one that declares the religion of Tunisia is Islam, a statement that is different from Islam is the basic source of legislation in Iraq.<sup>1</sup>

### **A Revolution Puts an End to Dictatorship**

The Tunisian Spring that broke out on 14 January 2011 brought out on the Tunisian stage unexpected El-Nahda Islamists who obtained 41 percent of the vote on the first democratic elections in the country, corresponding to 90 of the 217 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Although unexpected, their popularity was probably due to the fact that people believed that Islamists would do better because they are God-fearing people. But, Islamists had no experience in political leadership. That was bound to have negative repercussions on their rule. These Islamists had come out from prisons, from the "underground" where they had been hiding for fear of the dictator's terrible jails, but also from almost everywhere (from France, Italy, Germany, Canada, the USA...). They felt their time had come and they wanted to play an active role in the new, democratic Tunisia. Of course, there were other Tunisians who took the first plane they could catch to celebrate the end of the dictatorship, among them leftist exiles like Sihem Ben Sedrine, Mohamed Marzouki or Kamel Jendoubi, to name but a few. None of them, Islamists or merely political activists, had ever been involved in government responsibilities. El-Nahda activists declared themselves moderate Islamists. So did the US and Europe declare them.

However, Mohamed Charfi (2000), like Mohamed Talbi, historian and professor of literature, had declared the Islamists had only one claim "the implementation of the Shari'a; and two phobias: the West and women," whose social role according to Ghannouchi, is limited to bearing children and housework (Charfi, 48-49). That proved to be entirely true as further events were to confirm. A Saudi Arabia booklet entitled "Women under the protection of Islam" seeks to attract young women to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Its message is the following:

God in His wisdom gave women sensitive emotions, gentle feelings, the ability to be caring and loving. This enables women to do their natural duty of bearing children, breastfeeding, and ensuring the wellbeing of small children. (Schroeter, 2015).

Such qualities clearly emphasize male superiority over women, referring to "Men are in charge of women... As for those women from whom you fear rebellion, admonish them, banish them to beds apart, and scourge them" (Qur'an, verse 4:34).

### **The Islamists' project for women**

The Islamists who made their way on the political stage did not hide their views on women's status and place in society. To silence opposition, they based their assessments on the holy Qur'an and on their interpretations of it. For, can anyone object to the Word of Allah? Thus, they said that being impure (aaoura), women have to cover their hair as well as their body. They presented the hijab and the niqab as the best outfits to cover women's bodies and prevent men from losing their chastity by just looking at them. They denounced all those that, they said, were responsible for women's emancipation, namely Tahar Haddad, Habib Bourguiba, the West... Violence against women who refused to conform to their diktats started and increased gradually in order to silence women's voices while the number of hijabs and niqabs became increasingly visible throughout the country, in particular at higher educational institutions, creating tension and violence between Salafists and professors, administration, and secular students, professors refusing to teach students whose faces they could not see. In Salé (Morocco), a woman wearing a niqab cut the face of girls who did not wear the niqab, causing fear among the population (El Faiz, 2015).

Verbal and/or physical violence against women, for not wearing a hijab, for not being in their right place: home, became common. This violence was reproduced in the other countries of the region: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria... although on a much larger scale, at degrees that deprive women from any dignity. This subjugation of women can be attributed to the fact that Islamism had been part of life there for a long time. Indeed, if we take the example of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood had occupied an important position in the country since its foundation in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. In Tunisia, Al-Nahda was founded by Rached Ghannouchi in 1981 but although religious dignitaries were highly respected, they were not allowed to oppose political decisions. The niqab started to impose itself and became visible in the streets but also at universities. During the period they held power after the 23 October 2011 elections, Urfi (religious,

temporary) marriages were performed by Rached Ghannouchi who married several couples together on the grounds that young people want to get married but do not have the funds for it, so he provided for that. What happened afterwards to the young women when they found themselves with child and no husband since the marriage was not legally registered was of no concern to those promoting it.

In 2012, Egyptian Imam Wajdi Ghanim well-known for his support of girls'excision<sup>1</sup> or FGM, was invited in Tunisia to lecture in several cities and praise the benefits of that excision, an operation that is merely aesthetic, he insisted.

Bourguiba had used education to eradicate illiteracy. The Islamists used religion to counter that : hadn't Prophet Mohamed (PBOH) married Aisha when she was hardly 9? Rape became a weapon to frighten girls and women. It used to be a rare phenomenon in the country for two main reasons: either it was not reported to safeguard the family's honor, or it was criminalized even though not severely. In any case, it was a rare phenomenon. It must be stated though that in some countries, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, a raped girl can be assassinated by her family. That way, her honor and that of the family is saved. But, after the revolution, it became shockingly common. The message it conveys is "This is what happens to you if you do not conform to our instructions." This is clear in the following case: in 2012, Meriem was found out with her fiancé by 3 policemen in a parked car, in a deserted neighborhood, around 10 p.m. Raped by two of the policemen, while the third one was trying to get a bribe from the fiancé, Meriem sued. The policemen were not expecting she would dare do that and bring shame on her and on her family. For a time, to the justice, she was responsible of her rape. As one of her lawyers declared: it was "the first time that a woman made a complaint against the police and continued through the courts" [for sexual assault]. In the book (Guilty of being raped) that she wrote to depict her ordeal, Meriem denounced a dominating patriarchal system. In retaliation, she was accused of ill morals and had to appear at court on these grounds. In fact, this discriminatory attitude will prevail as long as legislation is not clear about that. Her rapists were first given 7-year sentences; they were doubled to 15-years in late 2014 (Baster and Merminod). In the meantime, a 3-year-old girl was raped in a kindergarten in La Marsa, and then another and another. Rape became one arm used to tame women and have them

follow Islamist diktat. Legislation itself supports sexual violence by allowing a minor's rapist to avoid jail by marrying his victim (article 227 of the penal code). A legislation that infuriates female activists is article 13 of the CPS for it requires a man to pay his wife a dowry if he wants to have a sexual relationship with her. If he has done so, he is authorized to have sex with her whether she agrees or not. Doesn't this mean that marital rape is authorized?

Islamists declare singleness a sin and pretend that women's high level of singleness is a consequence of their emancipation. The high level of literacy among girls has certainly contributed to the increase of singleness, a fact considered 'haram' by radical islamists although delayed marriage only means later marriage and less children. Raping girls seems to be a reaction to delayed marriages among women and lower national demography.

The attraction and contempt they feel for women make Islamists in some countries (Boko Hara in Nigeria, Daiesh in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere) kidnap, rape and sell as sex-slaves all the girls/women they put their hands on, particularly if they are not Muslim. That is what has dramatically and unfortunately been happening to the Yazidi and Kurdish populations (Al Arabya News, 2015).

Curiously, at the same time as they want women to disappear from the social landscape, they are encouraging young girls to go and satisfy jihadists' sexual needs in Syria and elsewhere in Iraq, Libya, and even in Tunisia. Norhaine Z. is a 30-year-old mother of two who went as a sex-jihadist in Syria with her husband. She reported she had sex with 100 terrorists (four per day) from different nationalities in just 27 days while her husband took care of the children, doing nothing but crying. "My life turned into hell," she said. A woman would get \$ 4,000 for joining jihad niqah (Yaakoubi, 2014). Some of those girls came back pregnant and gave birth to children from unknown fathers (Baker, 2013). What is going to happen to those children is a sad interrogation mark particularly when you know that adoption of fatherless children is a prohibited in Islam.

El-Nahda parliamentarians sought to introduce in the constitution the notion that women were "complementary" to men instead of "equal." The huge protest march that followed that attempt on 13 August 2012 - anniversary of the CPS promulgation - put an end to that. What was intended by radical Islamists was a ban on women's



autonomy. Islamist parliamentarians demanded the eradication of the CPS and Tunisia's ratification of the CEDAW, being indifferent to the fact that by doing so, they contributed to women's stigmatization, disgrace and submissiveness, expressing at the same time support for the demeaning way patriarchy considers them. Thus, instead of supporting new women candidacies in Tunisia, some women encouraged a smear campaign against them.

The CPS had changed the marriage institution by prohibiting and criminalizing polygamy; so, some Islamists declared polygamy had to be re-established for the country -Tunisia - to recover its true Arab-Muslim identity. What sort of an identity is it that ignores its origins? Indeed, a quick glimpse at Tunisia's great past and at its many illustrious civilizations that left important marks there show that the Tunisian is a product of the melting-pot that came out of the blend of all those Phoenicians, Romans, Sicilians, Byzantine, Spanish, Greek, Ottoman and Arab civilizations that lived in the country. For Tunisia was the home of such great people as Amilcar, Hannon, Asdrubal, Massinissa, Hannibal, Magon..., great warriors who fought for spreading and strengthening the power of Carthage. If Ben Ali, the former president, had ignored Bourguiba to his very death, the Islamists presented the latter as the enemy of Islam for he had caused the loss of the only identity (Arab-Muslim) they claimed affiliation to. They pretended that the changes they sought to bring were for the good of women. For example, polygamy would bring an end to women's singleness while protecting them from uterus-cancer, claimed Adel El Elmi, a fruit salesman turned into an Imam (Belhassine, 2014). Women found in the company of foreign people were arrested by the police although there is no law that prohibits the Tunisian people from being in the company of foreigners (Massy, 2014). Such unpleasant events happened sometimes to businesswomen in the company of business partners with the embarrassment that they may cause.

Amel Attia, a young female activist who had been arrested in a protest march following Mohamed Brahmi's assassination, declared:

Once inside the hall of the police station, some individuals, who weren't wearing police uniforms, took hold of me. I had the impression that I was being raped in the street. My attackers were rather bastards; their looks gave me that impression. This band of bastards surrounded me and began assaulting

me sexually. The policemen were going back and forth with no reaction at all (Bouzaienne, 2013).

In Tunisia, family-planning was implemented at the very beginning of the independence and abortion was allowed in 1973, the same year as the USA (Wade versus Wade). Habib Bourguiba had meant to eradicate under-development and his policy was a war against it. Demography was very high at the time of independence and Bourguiba knew his country would have no chance to win that war if that demographic trend continued. In some countries, particularly in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile and Dominican Republic, abortion is prohibited. In other countries, only when a woman's life is in danger is abortion allowed. Yet, during the time the Islamist party was running the country, abortion became difficult at public hospitals. Khedija Cherif, sociologist, activist and member of the International Federation of Human Rights said: "Criminal convictions imposed for clandestine abortions increase the victimization of these women who are already in an unbearable situation. These senseless laws must be abolished immediately, as required by the United Nations" (International Federation of Human Rights, 2014).

Decisions infringing on women's rights and dignity were being promulgated here and there in the Middle-East and North-Africa, following the spread of Islamism and Jihad.

### **ISIS or DAIESH: an Islamist State is Born**

Indeed, after Ben Laden and El Qaida, after the terrible event of September 11 that cost the lives of thousands of people in the name of Islam, another group had been patiently weaving its web in order to become even bigger. On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the birth of (الدولة الإسلامية), ad-Dawlat al-Islāmiyah) ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, that would head all Muslims and all Muslim States as a sort of federation. El Qaida used to be in Afghanistan/Pakistan before it started expanding to Iraq, North Africa, West Africa under various names, like Boko Haram in Nigeria, or Al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In Tunisia, in a moment of euphoria, Hamadi Jebali, Al-Nahda Prime minister in the early years of the Arab Spring, at a popular meeting announced a sixth caliphate was to take off from Tunis. This statement froze an awe-struck population and Hamadi Jebali retracted then, saying that was not what he had meant !

A very strong and active civil society never missed to react to any attempt they saw as a threat to their liberties and women's rights. The reservations made on the CEDAW were finally lifted on 23 April 2014 when the UN announced receipt of Tunisia's official demand. That made Tunisia the first country in the region to do so. Although the event is certainly a major step, more is needed and the democratic forces of the nation will have to maintain their mobilization as they have, indeed, been doing, until the Constitution finalized and adopted in January 2014 corresponds to the dispositions of the CEDAW.

## **Conclusion**

Thanks to women activists, Violence Against Women is today a well-known tragedy, highlighted worldwide. It is clearly the expression and structural consequence of social relationships of domination between the sexes. Violence feeds on hierarchies and inequalities between human groups, men being presented as superior to women. In spite of international and national efforts, this belief has not been eradicated. Governments are often responsible for that. For example, Tunisia did adopt a law against rape but it demanded proofs from the plaintiff-which is not always possible-without which the accuser could become the accused as the case of Meriem seen above shows: accusing the policemen of rape, she became accused of ill morals. In Somalia, in 2013, a journalist was sentenced to 365 days for reporting on a rape by soldiers. In Egypt, several girls/women were raped in the streets with everyone watching. Shaimaa El Sabbagh was killed during a peaceful demonstration. Some witnesses who reported on the killing were accused in spite of a legislation that supposedly protects witnesses. More than 600 million women live in countries where domestic violence is legal (Shannon, 2014). Better still, if in the U.S. a rapist has parental rights on a child born from rape, in Tunisia, a rapist can avoid jail if he agrees to marry the girl he has raped. The same used to apply in Morocco until the case of Amina who committed suicide after her marriage to her rapist in 2012. Where does all of that lead us? It only serves to demonstrate that radical Islamists' theory that home is the only haven for women is wrong. It has been demonstrated that it is the place by excellence where women are victims of all forms of violence on the part of family members. The problem is that reports on family violence are only made when there is death or very serious injuries. In 59% of the cases, women prefer not to report either because they are ashamed, or because they are afraid

to address the judiciary system. 37% women run away from home and only 6% go to the police (AAWORD, 2005: 36).

It is in the home sphere that women are more likely to be submitted to violence. Often justified by tradition or religion, these practices tend in reality to reinforce the prevailing power and gender relations. (AAWORD, 2005: 37).

In Iraq and in other countries, they encourage marriage for 8-year-old girls who "are subjected to physical and psychological suffering" (Yacoub and Salaheddin, 2014). And Abbas (2014) adds: "while they are promoting marriage with minors, reality is that there are in Iraq more than 180 repudiation cases per day because of such marriages." While the situation is more than dramatic for women and men as a matter of fact, in several countries, mainly in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and other countries, Tunisia has been able to overcome several threats by drafting a Constitution that while declaring Islam to be the religion of the country, draws a line between religion and politics and protects most international human rights.

Considering the ever increasing dimension of the forms of violence perpetrated against women and girls worldwide but most particularly in North-Africa and in the Muslim world, a new legislation is needed to eradicate all forms of violence (ATFD). Nothing less than full equality must be established in the home sphere as well as in the public sphere. It is the responsibility of the United Nations to realize that in order to put an end to the wrongs and pains inflicted on women; a UN Treaty, a legally binding instrument on violence against women is needed for women to be more secure in their local contexts and worldwide. That alone would not be enough though as long as there is disorder and violence in the neighboring countries in particular, as long as the international community has not taken stands to help in the establishment of peace and security in the regions exposed to violence. For example, why has the international community never taken action to abolish slavery in Mauritania? What has the UN done knowing what was taking place there then and now? There should have been a strong reaction then, meaning before the Arab Spring, and there should be a strong reaction now to put an end to this evil. If that is not done, how can one react to disapproval of the enslavement of free human beings by Daesh, Boko Haram or other terrorist groups? The great powers have been present in Tunisia, in Libya, in Mali, in Iraq... and so have the UN with the aim of providing help

in the consolidation of stability and also in building a more inclusive governance system in all those countries involved in the Arab Spring.

In spite of its formidable achievements in terms of democracy, its challenges represent an interrogation mark. However, "if Tunisia can avoid the pitfalls of major conflict and bad neighbors, the persistence of Tunisia's liberal regime over the next two decades would not at all be surprising" (Cincotta, 2015). Cincotta compares Tunisia's political transition "to ascents to liberal democracy in southern Europe in the 1970s, to East Asia from the late 1980s to the early 2000s and to Latin America more recently," a comparison that is rather encouraging. Political transition to a true democracy needs respect and elimination of all forms of discrimination against women as well as against minorities which can be achieved through awareness of citizenship and human rights education. Tunisia has met several pitfalls, some more dramatic than others, but it will overcome. Tunisia is a pioneer in terms of women's rights, however, it does not protect women from all forms of violence. It will clearly overcome with serious changes in the penal code and in the laws so that they conform to the 2014 Constitution that guarantees women's rights as well as to international conventions.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> In Iraq, women's status depends on Islamic law. Iraq ratified CEDAW in 1986 with reservations. It has not ratified the Optional Protocol on violence against women.

## **WOMEN AND EXTREMISM**

*Loubna AMHAIR*

Extremism is a dangerous phenomenon that has attracted the attention of many people and institutions, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East, and this phenomenon can at the same time an influence and can be influenced by other phenomena. Extremism is fundamentalism, roughness, and is trespassing all the limits.

The concept of extremism changes with time and place. For ancient scholars, religious extremism was associated with blasphemy and religious acts of rejection. It was depicted as a way of understanding religious texts away from the common meaning, an understanding that leads to one of two undesired results: overuse or neglect of the religious rules. In other words, the concept of extremism is used in reference to the distance taken from the norms and values and behaviors that are socially accepted, which could lead to rather individual or collective violence, organized in order to destabilize society and impose others' opinions by force.

From this vintage point, ideology may be turned into political activity that will often resort to the use of violence to enforce the principles that believe in extremist ideology or resort to psychological, physical or intellectual terrorism against anyone who stands in the way to achieve this goal.

Until recently, violent extremism, intolerance and terrorism were often seen as spheres for men without any consideration of the participation of women in them. However, the radicalization of women and their participation in terrorist organizations is becoming a significant phenomenon, as extremist attacks committed by women had increased and their continuous affiliation to the ranks of terrorist groups raises a lot of concern and apprehension.

Female extremism can be expressed through a variety of ways, but the most common one is female suicide bombers. However, this is not the only function that women serve in terrorist organizations; they may also be entrusted with other roles such as logistics, recruitment, executive leadership, fighting, and ideological or political indoctrination. Until the end of the 20th century, the role of women in terrorist organizations was mostly restricted to providing support to



their male counterparts, such as intelligence gathering or health care provision. Although women may still take up these jobs, there is a shift towards more extreme and grass root functions for women.

There are many reasons that may attract women to extremism. Two specific ones are relevant for this paper. First, revenge for a family member against those perceived to be the "murderers," which can easily be a factor to stimulate the female suicide bombers. Second, social alienation in societies where women are marginalized because of gender discrimination or lack of rights, taken as the starting point in attracting women to terrorist organizations who give them a sense of belonging, or even superiority. The feelings of women resulting from marginalization and discrimination and gender inequality are often used by terrorist groups who push them to extremism as a form of empowerment.

On the other hand, there are women activists who struggle to prevent extremism and hence counter it. The governments are well aware of the important and significant role women can play to face violent extremism, and invest this in strategies and programs to empower women, as well as reduce their recruitment by terrorist organizations, and urge women themselves to carry out actively to counter violent extremism. Indeed, to counter violent extremism, governments must build strategies based on the empowerment of women, starting from the fight against poverty and marginalization and lack of economic opportunities, which is one of the basic factors that drive women to violent extremism and extremist approach.

The Moroccan government has responded to terrorist threats by identifying ways and taking some measures to increase women's activities, building and strengthening their capacities and improving their livelihoods, thereby reducing the possibility of implication in extremism and terrorism. These measures include the establishment of micro-credit programs, and increase the enrollment of girls in primary schools and create ways to better living through work in garment factories.

In Morocco, where poverty also leads to exacerbation of extremism, the government has implemented several measures to combat extremism, and the reduction of the development of the differences based on gender and the integration of women in society. First, in 2004, the introduction of some amendments and revisions to the

family law, which aim to promote social and economic position of women. In 2005, the government launched a successful program to start the ratification of the presence of women preachers in the religious sphere, known as Murshidats, aiming to promote religious moderation and tolerance and to limit extremism. Now, more than 500 women have benefited from the program, their work is now being promoted and expanded in prisons and among young people and women in the communities.

Although it is difficult to gather specific and concrete statistics on the effects of these initiatives on the potential radicalization of women and their recruitment by terrorist groups, it shows the success of Morocco's strategy in the fight against terrorism. Indeed, when Morocco started to implement these initiatives in 2004, it was ranked 17 in the scale of indicators of terrorism issued by the Institute for Economics and Peace Index<sup>1</sup> data. By 2011, Morocco's rank has been improved and the country has now moved to the 39th place out of 158 countries.

The other way to fight terrorism is to involve women in the decision-making process, particularly in terms of development of policies and strategies that deal with extremism and anti-terrorism initiatives. The integration of women in such decisions is a recognition of their strategic role in fighting extremism because of their key central place in families and communities. It also raises women's voices in the areas of peace and security. The mothers are on the front-line of defense and prevention from extremist terrorism. Given their unique strategic function; mothers are often the heart of their families and due to this fact, they are often the closest to their children, and therefore have the ability to identify characteristics or behaviors that may refer to extreme ones.

Therefore, governments must recognize the increasing role of women as active participants in the terrorist groups and their ability to engage in extremism. We also call for increased government funding for research on the motives behind the extremism of women, and this would allow us to promote the development of effective preventive strategies development to address the root causes that lead to the radicalization of women. According to a 2006 report prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the UN, on "the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of fighting

against terrorism," terrorist groups still recruit massively marginalized individuals (who are often women) with the promise of a better life. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur explains that in order to reduce the appeal of terrorist groups, it is important that governments and parties promote and strengthen the role of women and children and meet their needs and protect and promote human rights in order to improve the situation of their lives.

With this in mind, and the fact that the combined effects that are motivating women to join the terrorist organizations can also be linked to a lack of rights and inequality between genders, governments must put more efforts to empower women through the promotion of educational, economic and professional opportunities for women and girls, this is not only as a measure to combat terrorism, but in their right to self as a human right and full citizenship.

In particular, we must focus on poor and rural areas and conflict zones, which represent fertile ground for terrorism and the highest rate of recruitment of potential extremists. Governments should also focus on cooperation with local civil society organizations, because they often have a greater ability to reach the individuals directly.

Another recommendation would be to increase government funding for capacity building for the staff of non-governmental organizations in order to empower their effectiveness in supporting the most vulnerable individuals to radicalization, as well as reducing the recruited ones by terrorist groups.

It important to keep in mind that the UN Security Council stressed in its resolution 1325 the role of women in peace-building and security, and the need for equal participation, which is based on an equal footing for women as well as their full participation in all efforts for the maintenance and the promotion of international peace and security.

Finally, we can say that the participation of women must be integrated and active in anti-terrorism initiatives, which form part of the overall agenda of peace and security. And thus the involvement of women in decision-making related to elaboration, implementation and evaluation of anti-terrorism policies and strategies.

Emphasis needs to be put on the implementation of the Resolution 1325, to increase the role of women in decision-making processes

effectively, without taking into account any gender perspective in actions and measures against terrorism, through the integration and the introduction of the gender approach in anti-terrorist policies and in their implementation.

**Notes**

<sup>1</sup> This indicator measures the countries ranging from the most affected by terrorism from top to bottom.



## **MASCULINITIES AND VIOLENCE IN THE MENA REGION**

*Mohammed YACHOULTI*

### **Introduction**

The aim of this paper is to discuss how masculinity/(ies) in the MENA region contributes and perpetuates violence against women. It also looks at some costs of this masculine violence. Based on the findings of the questionnaire addressed to Moroccan MA students and on national and international institutions and NGOs' reports, the paper argues that masculinity still shapes and organizes societies in the MENA region and legitimizes abusive actions towards its women.

The paper starts with a discussion of the notion of masculinity including the perception of Moroccan educated youth. I believe that understanding the masculine behavior and characteristics is important in order to analyze many social acts, including violence against women. The second part of the paper is divided into sections. The first reveals some shocking statistics of Masculine violence against women in the MENA region. The second one shows how legislation in the region is still not able to take the issue seriously. The paper finishes by addressing the costs of this masculine violence against women namely in Morocco and how to avoid them.

### **Masculinity/ities in the Mena region: understanding the concept**

In their book titled 50 Key Concepts in Gender Studies, Jane Pilcher and Imelda Whelehan define masculinity as "the set of social practices and cultural representations associated with being a man"<sup>1</sup>. Similarly, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines masculinity as "a unified set of personal characteristics, behaviors, and beliefs-including physical strength, assertiveness, emotional detachment, and competition".<sup>2</sup> Following these two definitions, it may be argued that when we are dealing with masculinity and its counterpart femininity namely in the MENA region, we don't deal with personal choices of individuals or with concepts personally in isolation of society. Rather, we are dealing with socially constructed gender identity and roles imposed upon an individual. In the MENA region, children learn and develop gender identities from an early age and gradually begin to avoid behavior they believe inappropriate

to their sex. Boys are always taught that in order to be 'real men', they must take on a tough disguise. This disguise allows them to show only certain parts of themselves and their identities that the dominant culture has defined as manly: these include risk-taking, physical toughness, aggression, violence, emotional control and overt heterosexual desire.<sup>3</sup> So to speak, man constructs an image of himself on the basis of what society expects of him. Man's perception is accumulated from his societal experiences and his socialization processes. In brief, masculine characteristics that include aggressiveness, dominance, strength and control are fed by the complexity of socio-cultural influences and sometimes consolidated by the legislative codes of many countries in the region. That is to say, society not only constructs masculinity but reinforces it through different social relations.

Further, at the linguistic level, it should be noted that neither Standard Arabic (the language of the Mena) nor its varieties (Moroccan Arabic is a good example) have a plural form of masculinity. In fact, this linguistic aspect is one way of legitimating masculinity as a homogeneous category that resists unpacking.

To investigate the validity of these claims, I addressed a questionnaire to a group of Master students about their perception of this concept of masculinity. The choice of this category stems from two reasons. First, these students come from different cities therefore they are representatives of almost all regions of Morocco. Second, they are believed to be both the products and leaders of social, economic and political changes that are sweeping the MENA nowadays. Therefore, my assumption before addressing this questionnaire was that their responses would reveal new and modern definitions that are totally different from the traditional assumptions. However, as the analysis will show later, the socio-cultural influences are always stronger than in factor mainly in the Mena region societies.

### **Item 1: The Gender Distribution of the Informants**

<b>Gender</b>	<b>The Number of informants</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
∑ Males	17	53,12 %
∑ Females	15	46,87 %

## Item 2: The age distribution of informants

Age	The Number of informants	The Percentage
∑ Between 20 & 25	18	56,25 %
∑ Between 26 & 30	11	34,37 %
∑ Between 31 & 35	2	6,25 %
∑ Between 36 & 40	1	3,12 %

The aim of the first and second item was to see the gender and age distributions of the informants respectively. I have distributed 40 questionnaires but the return rate is only 80 percent (32 questionnaires). Analyzing the return rate, the statistics show that gender distribution is roughly equal (males are represented with 53,12 percent and females are represented with 46,87). As for age distribution, the majority of informants are between 20 and 30 years old. This focus on educated youth, as already declared, is based on the assumption that this category enjoys certain intellectual means to conceive the principle of gender equality as a rational and democratic principle. Therefore, it would contribute in a way or another to trigger changes and correct assumptions. Also, the responses of these youngsters could be generalized to the beliefs of the youngsters in MENA because their religious, cultural and social affinities.

## Question 3: Which of these is /are the psychological traits of Masculinity

The psychology traits	The Number of informants	The percentage
∑ Reason	14	43,75 %
∑ Courage/ risk taking	26	81,25 %
∑ Fear	0	0%
∑ Authority	20	62,5 %
∑ Self-control	5	15,62 %
∑ Equilibrium	0	0 %
∑ Practical	5	15,62 %
∑ Intelligence	13	40,62 %
∑ Handling difficulties	10	31,23 %
∑ Precaution	1	3,12 %
∑ Sensitivity	0	0%
∑ Toughness	15	46,87 %
∑ Taking initiatives	5	15,62 %



The statistics above reemphasize the masculine qualities that have defined man through ages (physical toughness, aggression, emotional control). That is to say, Masculinity, even among modern educated youth, is still associated with courage, authority (power) and toughness. To explain, courage/ risk taking were mentioned 26 times, followed by authority which was cited 20 times, then comes toughness and reason with 15 and 14 times respectively. In fact, these statistics suggest only one fact: in the MENA region if a man chooses not to follow this ideal image of masculinity, or if the adopted behavior contradicts these qualities, he will automatically be socially rejected. He will be isolated and negative qualities are to be associated with him. So, in patriarchal societies, like in Morocco in particular and MENA region in general, this courage or risk-taking, power and toughness usually legitimize violence against women and in most of the time turn into a means by which men express their masculinity.

**Question 4: circles five main Moral qualities of masculinity**

Moral qualities	The number of informants
∑ Keeps his word	23
∑ Responsible	29
∑ Honest	19
∑ Non-fornicator	3
∑ Non hypocrite	12
∑ Non traitor	13
∑ Honorable	19
∑ Worthy	4
∑ Keeps a secret	18

The moral qualities category includes 9 qualities. To be responsible is the moral quality that heads the poll. It is cited 29 times. It is followed by the quality of (keep his word) with 23 citations. The qualities of being honorable and honest rank the third position of the poll with 19 citations. The fact of stressing the quality of being responsible stems from the belief in the binary opposition that men are strong, but women are weak. Men can work and women cannot. Men can earn money while are incapable of doing so. Men have enough space inside and outside their houses but women must stick

to their harem. Therefore, man is the only capable and legitimate person to take responsibility of everything including women. Actually, this belief is the result of a combination of biological, cultural and social influences and relate to our understanding of power in these societies of the MENA region.

**Question 5: Which of these do you believe is/are the social indicators of masculinity (choose one or two)**

Social indicators	The number of informants
Σ Home supporter	15
Σ Hard-working	19
Σ Has money	8
Σ Protecting the family	20

The social indicators category includes four elements. Protecting the family was cited 20 times, followed by hard-working with 19 times. Man as home supporter of the family comes in the third position because it was cited 15 times. In other words, these statistics reveal that the masculine image is based on being the protector and the sole of bread winner. Patriarchal system in the MENA locks women in closed spaces while at same time forces men (be they their fathers, brothers or husbands) to protect them and defend their honor. In other words, protecting family in the MENA means protecting its honor, and families usually associate their honor with the virginity of their unmarried daughters and the chastity of their married ones. Being a family protector gives the right to men to police and chastise women. Unfortunately, this is usually done in a violent way. This means that violence is understood in terms of male's obligation to protect family honor.

**Question 6: Which of these you believe is/are the sexual orientations of masculinity**

Sexual orientations	The number of informants
Σ Impotence	
Σ Homosexual	
Σ Bisexual	
Σ Heterosexual	32

Being heterosexual is viewed as the crucial feature to determine the masculinity of man. The desire of the other sex is a way of being valorized in society and of exercising power and control over women. In the MENA region, societies tolerate a considerable amount of bad behaviors from boys without defining them as deviant behaviors. These include illegal sexual relationship, sexual abuse and rape; they are considered as signs of men's virility and a strategic way of exercising power. In other words, they are used as a way of securing and maintaining the relations of male dominance and female subordination which are central to patriarchal social order.

Based on the analysis of the questionnaire, it is safe to conclude that masculinity in the MENA region is still viewed as a composite of various socially codified qualities and attributes that usually not only legitimize man's ability to protect and control but help normalize violence against women.

The coming section reveals some shocking statistics of the Masculine violence against women in the MENA.

### ***Masculinity, Violence Against Women and Legislation***

#### **Masculinity and violence against women: Shocking statistics**

Since societies in the region are patriarchal in their thinking and system of organization, power and aggressiveness are usually equated with masculinity, and thus violence against women turns, in most of the time, into a way of acting out or doing masculinity. By violence, I mean any harm against a person. It takes different forms and is perpetrated in different places. All over the world, women are believed to be victims of several kinds of physical and psychological violence. In the MENA region, "Women are vulnerable to violence because of their unequal social status, the generally weaker socio-economic positions and legal and cultural constraints"<sup>4</sup>.

Fadia Faqir argues that

"Violence against women in the Jordanian society is widely regarded as a family matter that affects large numbers of children and adults across their life span. Jordanian women are victimized physically, psychologically, and sexually by a wide range of behaviors that occur in a variety of cultural and social context (i.e., family, university and workplace). Violence against women takes place at home and is carried

out by perpetrators who are directly related the victims, making of the home 'one of the dangerous places for women'. Violence against women arrange from wife abuse (wife beating), to incest to sexual harassment to rape and honor killing. Statistics show that honor killings are on the rise. They are usually committed mostly by brother (61,9%) followed by fathers (14,3) then nephews (10%)".<sup>5</sup>

Also, the Population and Family Health Survey of 2007 revealed that one in three women aged 15-49 years who were or had been married reported being subjected to physical violence. Women with no education or only elementary-level education were twice as likely to report physical violence as those with secondary or higher education. and women whose husbands had low education levels were more likely to have experienced spousal violence.<sup>6</sup>

In the frame of The National Survey on Violence towards Women in Tunisia conducted in 2010, 3.873 women aged between 18 and 64 were questioned. 47.6% of these women reported having experienced at least one form of violence during their lifetimes and 32.9% during the last 12 months before the survey.

- 45 percent of the victims declared that violence has physical, mental and social effects.
- Almost 50 percent of victims declared leaving home and 17.8% have lodged a complaint.
- 42.1 percent have never spoken about violence before.
- 55 percent of the victims accepted violence as part of the order of things because of shame and fear of aggravating the situation.
- 73 percent of the victims does not seek help from anyone: The few that do seek help turn mostly to the family. Only 3.8 percent turn to the police station and 2.3 percent to health services.<sup>7</sup>

In Algeria, the National Survey on Violence against Women conducted in 2007 revealed that out of some 9000 reported cases of abuse, around 50 per cent of the victims were aged 23-40 years. In two-thirds of the reported cases, the husband was the aggressor, with violence often committed in front of children. 5 percent per cent of the reported cases were defined as sexual abuse, and around 3

per cent were rape cases. The analysis concluded that women with low education level and not in paid employment were particularly vulnerable to verbal and physical violence Algeria.<sup>8</sup>

In Morocco, Haut Commissariat au Plan conducted in a national study on the prevalence of violence against women in 2011. 9,5 million women of ages between 18 and 64 were questioned. The study found that 62.8 percent of these women had been victims of some form of violence during the year preceding the study. This same study found that 55 percent of these acts of violence were committed by a victim's husband, and the violence was reported by the wife in only 3 percent of such cases.<sup>9</sup>

Given these statistics, the main question that pops up in this regard is the position of legislation vis-à-vis this situation. How do the penal codes in the MENA address the issue and how do they try to restrict it ?

### ***Masculinity and Violence Against Women: the Legal Dimension***

Despite the constitutional and legal changes that many societies in the MENA have undergone in the last five years, violence against is still regarded a private matter and a family issue. For example in Jordan, the Parliament enacted "the Protection against Family Violence Act" in January 2008 with the aim of - preserving family ties and minimizing the impact of criminal acts in cases of violence among family members (CEDAW/C/JOR/5, para. 29).<sup>10</sup> The Act established - family reconciliation committees to enable parties to find amicable solutions before a case is taken to court. According to article 7 of the Act, - preference shall be given to referrals to family reconciliation committees prior to taking any of the protective measure stipulated in this Act, providing that the family's best interest is taken into consideration<sup>11</sup>. The Act provides for the court to issue protection orders when necessary and establish penalties against perpetrators for violating protection orders and re-offending. Courts might also establish the payment of compensation to victims (CEDAW/C/JOR/5, para. 29).<sup>12</sup>

Despite positive provisions in this legislation, obstacles still remain with regard to the definition of violence, which is limited to violence occurring within the family; the explicit focus on family reconciliation as a preferred solution; and the low levels of implementation of this Act by the courts since it was enacted. The norm is a practice of

resolving cases through reconciliation and not through accountability measures such as prosecution and punishment of perpetrators.<sup>13</sup>

The Tunisian Penal Code punishes spousal violence and considers it an aggravating circumstance, and Tunisian legislation punishes several sexual crimes, including rape in Article 227 of the Penal Code and, since 2004, sexual harassment in Article 226(bis) of the code. But these provisions are not based on a holistic legislative approach that confronts gender-based violence. The legislator fails to define sexual violence in line with international standards and does not distinguish between public or private violence. The legislator is also silent on numerous types of violence, such as symbolic and economic violence.<sup>14</sup>

Currently, no specific legislation addressing violence against women exists in Morocco. Instead, violence against women is covered under the outdated, generally applicable provisions of the 1962 Penal Code (most recently amended as concerns violence against women in 2003), and rarely enforced by the justice system in cases of gender-based violence, such as sexual harassment, rape, and domestic abuse.

Moroccan NGOs report that women face significant challenges when reporting domestic violence to the police. In general, domestic violence cases are handled with "carelessness and the lack of seriousness and rigor."<sup>15</sup> When women attempt to seek protection from the police, NGOs report that frequently women must wait for a long time and, when they are finally interviewed about the incidents of domestic violence, the police ask questions with "a great deal of sarcasm" and make comments that imply that the women provoked the violence directly or through misbehavior.<sup>16</sup> The result is that a woman who attempts to seek protection from domestic violence is made to feel that "... she's accused somehow by the police officers." Also, "The slowness of the procedures makes women lose confidence in the authorities and give up on filing any complaints."<sup>17</sup> All of these factors create in victims of domestic violence a lack of faith in the entire justice system and explain why women frequently don't even bother to bring cases or drop them in the end.

### ***The Cost of Masculine Violence Against Women***

Violence against women affects the health, psychological and economic stability of women, their families, and their communities.

Violence affects every aspect of women's lives – from their personal health and safety, to the safety of their families, to their ability to earn a living.

The affects and aftermaths of violence makes women stop at least temporarily from going to their work, a fact which cause them sometimes to lose their jobs, or postpone their upgrading and the increase of their wages and incomes.

During the period of medication and psychological treatment and follow-up, the repercussion of this violence extend to impact the victim's family, especially her children. It usually affects their studies, their future career and their mental health and social stability.

The study conducted by the International Center for Research on Women and the United Nations population Fund in 2009 revealed the following estimates for the costs of violence against women in Morocco.

- 16,7 percent of women victims of violence perpetrated by their partner go to health services, 8,7% of these victims resort to the police and 13,5 percent to justice and 6,9 percent to social services.
- The average cost or expenses to be borne by the by victims of violence amount to 1809 dirhams for the total medical expenses, and the amount of 969 dirhams of the total cost of the special police services and 2349 for the total legal fees, and 249 dirhams for transportation costs in order to resort to social services .
- The cost incurred by the public facilities as a result of violence for one of the victim's reach 1680 dirhams, that is the overall average direct cost for each victim in Morocco amounting to a total of 7056 dirhams, which was considered by the study constitutes 29,5% of gross domestic product per capita in 2010.<sup>18</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Despite overcoming the taboo aspect it had had for decades and becoming an omnipresent issue among decision-makers, stakeholders, and feminists, statistics of this phenomenon is still on the rise namely is societies that are still governed by the patriarchal ideologies and misogynist attitudes towards women. Interestingly, the costs of

violence of this phenomenon can be borne by many individuals, including victims, perpetrators, or other individuals affected by violence; businesses; governments at all levels; and by society in general. In other words, Violence against women affects national economy negatively. A lot of money is spent on treating the effects of violence. The absence of women victims of violence from their work lowers productivity which in its turn affects economic growth and reduces standard of living; it also lowers earnings and reduces savings and investments. Violence, therefore, has a significant negative influence on national economic well-being. Therefore, enacting a strict law against perpetrators of violence against women is the only mechanism to cope with the financial loss incurred by the victim and the State and as a means for development.

## Notes

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- <sup>10</sup> Manjoo, Rashida. May 2012. Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, United Nations. [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16-Add1\\_en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16-Add1_en.pdf).



- <sup>11</sup> Manjoo, Rashida. May 2012. Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, United Nations.[http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16-Add1\\_en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16-Add1_en.pdf).
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> 'Sexual violence in Tunisia: from denial to dawning recognition' in fidh2014.<https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middle-east/tunisia/15425-sexual-violence-in-tunisia-from-denial-to-dawning-recognition>.
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- <sup>17</sup> The Advocates for Human Rights and Global Rights, 2012. [http://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/uploads/morocco\\_hrc\\_vaw\\_may\\_2012.pdf](http://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/uploads/morocco_hrc_vaw_may_2012.pdf).
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## POSTFACE

*Helmut REIFELD*

Shortly before this book could go to print, events in Germany brought new evidence that contributed to the imminent need to find new solutions for the problems discussed here. During the night of New Year's Eve 2015/2016, there were multiple events that exhibited an unprecedented degree of sexual assaults against women. While traditionally, this evening is cheerful (especially the countdown to the New Year), this year some cities experienced violence on a large scale. Not only in the dramatic case of Cologne, but also in Hamburg and a few other cities, groups of 10 to 30 young men repeatedly encircled small groups of young women. They infringed, attacked, robbed and in few cases even raped them. Very soon it became clear that the large majority of them were immigrants from Arabic and Northern African countries.

After two weeks of investigation, it is assumed that merely in Cologne there were about 1.500 young men mainly from Maghreb states that had gathered on the place between the main railway station and the Cathedral. More than 500 criminal complaints have been given to the police, out of which 237 were based on accusation of sexual attacks and four even of rape. Up to now<sup>1</sup>, only 19 suspects have been identified, out of which ten came from Morocco and four from Algeria. The rest of them could not be identified because they were lacking identity cards. Ten out of these 19 had just applied for asylum; the rest was staying in Germany illegally.

These events of New Year's Eve immediately penetrated the political debate about the situation of refugees in Germany and profoundly affected the public opinion. Neither among the police nor in the political realm could anyone have imagined the possibility of such assaults and infringements against women. As an immediate consequence, first carnival-celebrations for February have been cancelled. In Bornheim, near Cologne, men have been excluded from entry to the public baths for the time being because women didn't feel safe anymore. But the core problem is neither the insufficient reaction of the police, who at first had severely been criticized, nor the precautions that need to be taken in order to better equip the police. Gatherings of this kind without a strict entry control are

difficult to protect. At the end of the day, security is not primarily a technical problem. It is mainly a question of perception and attitude. All over Germany, the events of New Year's Eve have re-invigorated the debate about the reality of sexual assaults in general and the policy in Germany to prevent it. With regard to the incoming refugees, this debate appears to have been considered a taboo. The extent to which future options for integration of the large number of refugees will be affected by these recent events remains open.

What is important at the political level is the fact that for the first time since September 2015, a majority of the population doubts that the new German policy towards refugees can be implemented the same way as it has been during the last four months. This doubt is even reflected, in one way or another, across all political parties, within parliament as well as within the government. Policy however cannot be driven exclusively by public opinion. What is more important is that existing laws and preventive measures are uniquely applied and equally implemented for everybody.

It was chancellor Merkel who, just one day after the events, reminded the public of article 1 of the German Constitution which reads: "Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." Following this guideline, the full and comprehensive equality of women and men would be the best indicator for the implementation of Human Rights. The more women are disrespected, the more violent and inhumane a society will become.

At the same time, the immediate political debate that followed the events of New Year's Eve brought up two arguments that seemed to have been "forgotten" during the months before. First, there are some refugees who carry with them what the majority of them is actually fleeing from: violence, disrespect of women and hatred of the West. Second, not all refugees are willing to integrate into German society. In addition, the question was brought up again whether violence against women is rejected sufficiently from all Germans themselves, whether each "no" of a woman is always and everywhere accepted as a "no", and whether – as Henriette Reker, the new First Mayor of Cologne put it – it is always possible for a woman, to keep men "at arm-length away" if she wants to.

The immediate consequence, it was quickly agreed at the political level, is not to enact new laws but to implement the existing ones

rigorously, more rapidly and equally towards everybody. At the end of the day, any solution has to be based not only on democracy and rule of law, but also on tolerance and equal respect for every human being. As one victim of Cologne's New Year's Eve summed up her experience quite hauntingly: "All at once, those whom we wanted to accept have become the evil. We couldn't even give integration a chance." And from her personal perception she added: "Fear comes up at a tearing pace. Reason only appears slowly and in an uncomfortable way. ... Even if fear remains, this is no reason to let it govern us."<sup>2</sup>

### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Last information: Anant Agarwala and Martin Klingst, „Zeigen, wo der Ausgang ist“, Die Zeit 3/2016, 14.01.2016.

<sup>2</sup> Malin Schulz, Mein Silvester, [www.zeit.de/audio](http://www.zeit.de/audio).



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Admittedly, the post-Arab Spring turmoil is affecting men, women, and children, but specific types of pernicious violence systematically target women and girls. The post-Arab Spring initial backlash on women's rights is not only gathering momentum every day, but it is developing into unprecedented new types of violence against women with the dangerously mounting tide of Jihadists.

This volume contains papers from Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, The USA and Germany. The central aim of the book is to document and unveil the new types of violence that women are subject to across the Middle East and North Africa region, link them to the familiar types, understand their social, economic and political ramifications, dig out their surface and deeper underpinnings especially in relation to Jihadism, propose strategies to stop them, and seek short- and long- term policies that would implement these strategies.

